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Abstract 
Studies of democracy have recently shown that not only are democracies globally experiencing 
signs of democratic deconsolidation, but evincing a regression towards authoritarianism. This 
is evident in a growing lack of support amongst citizens for democratic regimes, who are often 
opened to non-democratic alternatives. Deconsolidation has been particularly evident in 
contexts where poor governance has failed to deliver the economic and political goods expected 
by citizens in a democratic regime. South Africa, which is the case under analysis, has been 
manifesting such signs of deconsolidation. This is because civic society has, not only become 
disillusioned with the quality of  governance amid growing scandals of corruption and nepotism 
under the Zuma administration, but increasingly open to radical populist ideas. While there are 
studies drawing on theories of democratic consolidation to analyse South Africa’s democracy, 
there has been limited inquiry based on the analytical approach of democratic deconsolidation. 
Furthermore, few have applied a holistic approach in analysing the state of South Africa’s 
current democracy. It is this deficit that the study addresses through an analysis of South 
Africa’s democracy during the years of the Zuma administration. 
The research questions motivating this study are whether South Africa’s democracy 
deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma administration, 
and whether poor governance – understood as being partisan to personal or special relationships 
- facilitated the process of deconsolidation. In addressing the research problem, this study uses
an analytical framework of democratic deconsolidation adopted from the work of Schedler 
(2001) and others such as Foa and Mounk (2017) to construct the conditions which are 
indicative of the deconsolidation process: poor governance (as an instigator), weak structures, 
negative attitudes and disruptive behaviour.  
This study finds that South Africa’s democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally 
and behaviourally – and that poor governance has been particularly instrumental in facilitating 
this process. The study shows that the overarching national project of the ANC – the National 
Democratic Revolution and its concomitant strategy of cadre deployment – served as a catalyst 
for the state capture project and the web of patronage under the Zuma administration. In 
deploying loyalists into key positions and being partisan to personal considerations, the Zuma 
administration undermined the impartial aspirations of the Constitution. The result is that, 
structurally, the web of patronage under Zuma has degenerated into a culture of disdain for 
constitutional governance, as typified in cases such as the Nkandla dispute. Moreover, it is 
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shown that the economic cost of poor governance has been dire, as indicated by the rising rates 
of unemployment, poverty and inequality amid ailing parastatals such as Eskom. This study 
shows that, attitudinally, poor government performance has eroded South Africans’ faith in 
democracy and made former supporters of democracy receptive to non-democratic (populist) 
parties, such as the EFF. The openness to radicalism has also been accompanied by an upsurge 
in violent protest action as a response to the government’s poor performance. While these 
conditions clearly point to South Africa’s democracy deconsolidating, deconsolidation itself it 
not an end state but a process that can be reversed.
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Opsomming 
Studies van demokrasie het onlangs gewys dat nie net ondervind demokrasieë wȇreldwyd 
tekens van demokratiese agteruitgang [dekonsolidasie] nie, maar neig dit ook om regressie te 
wys na outoriatisme. Dit is sigbaar in die groeiende verlies aan ondersteuning onder burgers 
van demokratiese regerings, wat meer oop is vir nie-demokratiese alternatiewe. Agteruitgang 
is veral sigbaar in die konteks waar swak regering misluk om te voorsien in die ekonomiese 
vooruitgang wat die burgers verwag van `n demokratiese regering. Suid-Afrika, die 
gevallestudie onder analise, manifesteer sulke tekens van dekonsolidasie. Dit is omdat die 
burgerlike samelewing nie net ontnugter is deur die kwaliteit van demokratiese regering te 
midde van groeiende skandale van korrupsie en nepotisme onder die Zuma administrasie nie, 
maar ook toenemend oop is vir radikale populistiese idees. Terwyl daar studies is wat 
gevolgtrekkings maak oor teorieë van demokratiese konsolidasie om Suid-Afrika se 
demokrasie te analiseer, was daar beperkte ondersoek gebasseer op die analitiese benadering  
van demokratiese konsolidasie. Verder het baie min`n holistiese benadering toegepas om die 
staat van Suid-Afrika se huidige demokrasie te analiseer. Dit is hierdie tekortkoming wat diė 
studie addresseer deur `n analise van Suid-Afrika se demokrasie gedurende die jare van die 
Zuma administrasie. 
Die navorsingsvrae wat hierdie studie motiveer is of Suid-Afrika se demokrasie struktureel, 
houdingsgewys en gedragsgewys agteruitgegaan het gedurende die Zuma administrasie , en of 
swak regering – verstaan as deel van persoonlike of spesiale verhoudings- die proses van 
agteruitgang gefasiliteer het. Die studie gebruik `n analitiese raamwerk van demokratiese 
verval om die navorsingsprobleem aan te spreek, aangeneem van die werk van Schedler (2001) 
en andere soos Foa en Monk (2017) om die toestande te konstrueer wat aanwysend is van die 
proses van agteruitgang: swak regering [as `n opstoker], swak strukture, negatiewe houdings 
en ontwrigtende gedrag.  
Die studie bevind dat Suid-Afrika se demokrasie het struktureel, houdingsgewys, en 
gedragsgewys agteruitgegaan- en dat swak regering instrumenteel was om die proses te 
fasiliteer. Die studie wys ook dat die oorkoepelende nasionale projek van die ANC – die 
Nasionale Demokratiese Rewolusie en die samegaande strategie van kader ontplooïng – wat 
gedien het as katalisator vir die staatskaping projek en web van begunstiging– onder die Zuma 
administrasie. Deur die uitplasing van lojaliste in kernposisies en deur deel te vorm van 
persoonlike oorwegings., het die Zuma administrasie die onpartydige aspirasies van die 
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Grondwet ondermyn. Die gevolg was dat struktureel, die web van bevoorregting onder Zuma 
gedegenereer tot `n kultuur van minagting vir konstitusionele regering, soos getipeer in die 
Nkandla geval. Verder wys dit die verskriklike koste van swak regering , soos aangedui deur 
die styging in werkloosheid, armoede, en ongelykheid te midde van sukkelende parastatal soos 
Eskom. Die studie wys dat houdings en swak regeringsvertoning Suid-Afrikaners se geloof 
weggevreet het en  maak dit Suid-Afrikaanse voormalige ondersteuners ontvanklik is vir nie-
demokratiese Partye soos die EFF. Die oop beleid van radikalisme word ook vergesel van `n 
toename in geweldadige protes as reaksie op die regering se swak vertoning. Terwyl die 
toestande duidelik die verval van Suid-Afrika se demokrasie uitwys, is agteruitgang nie `n end 
staat nie, maar `n proses wat omgedraai kan word. 
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Chapter I – Introduction to the Study 
1.1 Background and Rationale 
Democracy, as a form of government and regime type, has been the subject of a substantial and 
significant amount of inquiry. However, political scientists have yet to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the regime’s complexity, multidimensionality and 
metamorphosis. While democracy has demonstrated its appeal to peoples across the globe, and 
has been successfully consolidated in certain parts of the world, it has recently shown worrying 
signs of decay characterised by a lack of civic support for democracy and appeals to non-
democratic (populist) alternatives in some contexts (Diamond, 2015:142; Plattner; 2016; Foa 
and Mounk, 2017).  This period of democratic decay, like the study of democracy itself, has 
yet to be fully grasped and understood holistically.  
Nonetheless, as Plattner (2016:1) suggests, a starting point for understanding democracy today 
must also take into consideration “the context of its global fortunes over the past two centuries”. 
Huntington (1991) has effectively chronicled the spread of democratisation and described it in 
terms of three waves. The first of these, began in early 1828 and slowly but steadily gathered 
pace until 1926. During this time democracy in its minimalist sense consisted of certain limited 
freedoms, an insistence on the rule of law and male suffrage; it was instituted in a dozen or so 
European and European settler countries as well as nations born from the former European 
empires (Plattner, 2016:3). This slow and gradual spread of democratic ideals was met with a 
reverse wave by the 1920s as many of these democracies broke down in the wake of the First 
World War. However, by the late 1940s to the 1960s a second democratic expansion ensued. 
This included transitions in countries defeated in World War II (including Germany, Japan and 
Italy) as well as newly independent (decolonised) states such as India, Jamaica and Israel 
(Plattner, 2016:3). According to Huntington (1991), there then followed a second reverse wave 
(1958-1975), when many newly decolonised states and regimes in certain Latin America 
countries broke down and reverted to forms of authoritarianism. However, Huntington (1991) 
observed a third wave of democratisation in the 1980s in which the regime was adopted in 
Latin America and reached all the way across parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet 
Union and Africa (Diamond, 2015; Plattner, 2016). During this time democracy experienced a 
remarkable global run as its spread was unprecedented. That is, until 2006, when the 
“expansion of freedom and democracy in the world came to a prolonged halt” (Diamond, 
2015:142).  
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Since then, scholars have increasingly observed worrying trends in the development of new 
and established democratic regimes. Foa and Mounk (2016:6) observed that recently trust in 
liberal political institutions has declined; voter turnout and civic participation in the democratic 
process weakened; and most concerning is that there is an increasing appeal by citizens in 
democracies for non-democratic (authoritarian, populist) politics, which collectively constitute 
potential threats to democracy. Similarly, Howe (2017:15) notes that in the contemporary 
world far-right parties have made increasing electoral gains across many regimes previously 
considered consolidated democracies. In addition, scholars such as Haggard and Kaufman 
(1994), and Maeda (2010) indicate that the erosion of democracy stems not only from a lack 
of civic desire for, and commitment to, democratic principles and norms, but moreover that 
prolonged periods of poor governance and negative economic growth have drained democratic 
institutions of their democratic content, thereby resulting in poor political performance. These 
conditions have sparked increasing inquiry as to why democracies are experiencing this 
withdrawal. Consequently, the study of democratic deconsolidation has emerged and – despite 
still being in its infancy – it is beginning to expand.  
South Africa, it is argued, has also been manifesting these ‘warning signs’ of democratic 
deconsolidation. This could be because South African civic society is observed to be 
increasingly “disillusioned and dissatisfied with the quality of [the] implementation” of 
democracy (Graham, 2013:ii). These trends in disillusionment are observed to have been 
proliferating amid growing scandals of corruption and nepotism implicating high-level 
ministers and the former president, Jacob Zuma in incidents of looting state resources. These 
scandals have even gone as far as prompting investigative reports by the former Public 
Protector – such as the State of Capture report1 – and leading to several commissions of inquiry, 
including the state capture commission, the Mokogoro commission and the SARS commission, 
to mention a few. Often the scandals of corruption are publicized alongside dire economic 
conditions of rising rates of unemployment, poverty and inequality. As Graham (2013:5) 
observes: 
Worrying problems that have existed since 1994 but have begun spiralling out 
of control in recent years (especially 1999/2000) are threatening [the] 
                                                 
1 The State of Capture report is an investigative report into the “alleged improper and unethical conduct by 
[former] President [Zuma] and other state functionaries relating to alleged improper relationships and involvement 
of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises 
resulting in improper and possibly corrupt award of state contracts” (Office of the Public Protector, 2016:4).  
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apparently successful democratic progress. Increasingly, reports of incidents of 
violent crime threatening the security of the individual; corruption in public and 
corporate life, so-called political favouritism where government members are 
seen to be above the law; intense xenophobic violence directed against 
immigrants and migrants; oft-bemoaned dysfunctional service delivery and 
increased [strike] activity; the crisis of power and leadership in the African 
National Congress (ANC) in 2008; the widening of the gap between black elites 
and poor blacks, a resurgent racialization in society; the lack of real progress 
on land reform and redistribution; and concerns over continued ANC party 
dominance and perceived threats to the Constitution have led to a growing 
perception that South Africa’s quality of democracy is wavering. 
More worrying is that in addition to the decline in civic support for democracy, there is a 
simultaneous increase in appeals for populist and non-democratic alternative regime types 
(Steenekamp, 2017:67; de Jager & Steenekamp, 2019:12). In this regard, support for the self-
proclaimed leftist radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has grown increasingly – with the 
EFF gaining 6.35% of the vote and 25 seats in the National Assembly in the 2014 national 
elections, and then 11% of the vote and 44 seats in the National Assembly after the 2019 
national elections. Moreover, this support has come largely from the workers, the youth and 
the disenfranchised, who have become disillusioned with the performance and quality of 
democratic governance and have increasingly adopted radical dispositions towards politics (de 
Jager & Parkin, 2017:5). Nonetheless, while, the traction gained by the EFF remains marginal 
compared to the performance of the ruling, dominant party, the increasing support for the EFF 
speaks to a growing pool of citizens resorting to radical political action, which has the potential 
to threaten the stability and functioning of the democratic regime.   
Despite these warning signs of democratic decay, there has been limited inquiry into the current 
state of South Africa’s democracy. While there are studies proceeding from the theoretical 
standpoint of democratic consolidation to analyse South Africa’s democracy, there has been 
limited inquiry on the basis of an approach founded on the notion of democratic 
deconsolidation. Additionally, with the exception of the work by Graham (2013), few 
commentators have applied a holistic or multidimensional approach in analysing the state of 
South Africa’s democracy. Hence, the trends of civic disaffection and poor economic growth 
as well as the effects of poor governance contributing to democratic erosion have not been 
sufficiently studied in the South African context. This study therefore aims to use an analytical 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4 
 
framework derived from the literature on democratic deconsolidation (as well as consolidation) 
to analyse and assess whether South Africa’s democracy has deconsolidated structurally, 
attitudinally and behaviourally as a result of poor governance under the Zuma administration 
(2008-2018).   
1.2 Preliminary Literature Review: South Africa’s Democratic Progress 
South Africa’s relatively peaceful negotiated transition from a racially oppressive apartheid 
regime (which encompassed deep and often violent polarization) to a vibrant multiracial 
constitutional democracy is widely regarded as a “miracle” (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:96; 
Steenekamp, 2017:59). Hence, monitoring the development and progress of democratization 
in South Africa makes for an interesting case study. However, it should be noted that most 
studies on democratic consolidation of South Africa took place in the early years of its 
transition and contemporary assessments have begun to emerge only recently. Furthermore, 
these assessments often focused on single-factor analysis, thereby lacking a holistic perspective 
on the prospects of democracy in South Africa. 
Nonetheless, these studies are valuable for their indications of various factors such as electoral 
(party) dominance and disproportionate (often negative) socio-economic development 
outcomes, which are constitutive of potential threats that could impede the move towards South 
Africa consolidating its democracy. In this regard, there is a broad consensus in the literature 
that South Africa’s democracy has yet to be confirmed as consolidated (Kotzé & Loubser, 
2017:35).  
In the early analyses of the South African case, many authors point to the issues of the 
incompatibility of a dominant party system in democratic regimes, the nature of the ruling 
(dominant) party, and the weakness of viable opposition as factors threatening democratic 
consolidation (Jung & Shapiro, 1995; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999; Habib & Taylor, 1999; 
Southall, 2003; Butler, 2009). Here, the ANC’s electoral dominance (which is regarded as 
cemented in the future electoral landscape of the country because of its historical symbolic 
identity as a liberation movement) has raised concerns for democratic development in South 
Africa on the basis that it reflects a weakness of viable opposition (Jung & Shapiro, 1995; 
Giliomee & Simkins, 1999; Habib & Taylor, 1999; Southall, 2003). Jung and Shapiro (1995: 
270) note that from the outset of the democratic transition in South Africa there was a lack of 
“a system of opposition institutions that any healthy democracy requires”. Echoing this view, 
Giliomee and Simkins (1999:340) contend that the dominance of the ANC strips the state’s 
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democratic character of “genuine competition and electoral uncertainty and replaces it with a 
process that is self-sustaining”, one in which the dominant party is nearly always guaranteed a 
win. This argument was founded on the basis of Huntington’s (1991) ‘two turnover test’, which 
theorizes that a democracy could only be considered as consolidated once there have been at 
least two alternations in power; if the conditions of this ‘test’ are not met, then the prospects of 
South Africa’s democracy succeeding are hampered by a lack of sites for counter-elites to form 
and vie for a position as a potential alternative government (Jung & Shapiro, 1995:272).  
Furthermore, Giliomee and Simkins (1999:xx) contend that the challenge to establishing a 
strong viable opposition in South Africa lies in the racialized structure of South African society 
and politics. In other words, the racialized nature of political activities and the electoral 
preferences of South African citizens inhibit the possibility of the development of a viable 
alternative to the current government. Schrire (2001:141) contends that most opposition parties 
in South Africa do not vary greatly in terms of their centrist ideological approach to politics. 
Echoing this, Lipton (2014:5) suggests that the weakness of opposition is not the result of the 
demos voting along racial lines, but rather the result of the inability of the opposition to move 
away from racial politics towards a politics of interest. Hence political affiliation continues to 
centre on historical ties as opposed to class-based politics. Agreeing with Lipton (2014), Habib 
and Taylor (1999:263) contend that “the failure to develop a strong parliamentary opposition” 
reflects the inability of opposition leaders to diversify away from using the racial prism through 
which they approach (view) electoral strategies and move towards developing strategies that 
reflect interests. The majority of opposition parties in South Africa have been largely criticized 
on this basis for “failing to transcend identity politics” (Edigheji, 2004:16). Notwithstanding 
these varying explanations, most studies concede that the sustained electoral dominance of the 
ANC coupled with the lack of a viable opposition capable of creating a power turnover 
indicates the impediment of democratic consolidation in South Africa.  
In addressing these arguments, de Jager and Meintjies (2013) propose an alternative position 
in relation to party dominance and the perceived weakness of opposition in South Africa. 
According to de Jager and Meintjies (2013:1), the absence of an alternation of power and a 
viable opposition is not reflective of ideological difficulties or racialised politics; rather it is 
the result of an uneven playing field created by a dominant party system. Drawing on the work 
by Levitsky and Way (2010), de Jager and Meintjies (2013:1) contend that the inability of 
opposition parties to organize effectively and bring about an alternation of power is the result 
of a playing field skewed by disparities of resources, media and state institutions created by a 
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dominance solidified by the ANC in these areas. For de Jager and Meintjies (2013:1) these 
disparities are the result of the way in which the ANC has dealt with the Public Funding of 
Representatives Political Parties Act 103 (1997), which empowers the executive, together with 
recommendations from Parliament, to allocate public funds according to the principle of 
proportionality and equality. In this regard, the ANC government has extensively given more 
weight to the principle of proportionality (90%) than to that of equality (10%). Therefore, the 
ANC has received the lion’s share of public funding, which has left opposition parties with a 
lack of resources to organize effectively. Thus, it is less a weak opposition than a weakened 
opposition. 
Furthermore, regarding electoral dominance and the nature of such dominance, many authors 
express the fear that the long-ruling ANC government will struggle to make the transition from 
a liberation movement to a political party that has to vie for power as it cannot rule indefinitely 
(Jung & Shapiro, 1995; Melber; 2002; Southall, 2003; Suttner, 2004). Here the self-proclaimed 
majoritarian character and identity of the ANC is seen as potentially hampering the process of 
democratic consolidation. In this regard Suttner (2006:7) argues that the ideology and rhetoric 
of the ANC, in which it expresses itself as constituting ‘the nation’, does not distinguish 
between acting as a liberation movement and as a political party. Suttner (2004:768) argues 
that becoming the dominant force in government implies that the ANC must enter into a process 
that necessitates different modalities in relation to its expected role, as well as in its relationship 
to its members. In this regard, where liberation movements were granted legitimacy (support) 
by way of their legacy of struggle, political parties must vie for support and cannot rule 
indefinitely (Melber, 2002:162). This implies that the approach to democratic governance by 
the ANC, which draws on its history (legacy) as a liberation movement, is likely to hinder the 
prospects of democratic consolidation in South Africa. Hence, Suttner (2004:768) argues that 
for democratic consolidation to be realized in South Africa necessitates a shift away from the 
majoritarian character of the ANC towards an embrace of pluralism “in both the narrow 
constitutional and electoral sense of multiparty democracy”.  
Furthermore, du Toit and de Jager (2014:111), commenting on dominant party systems, suggest 
that there is a tendency within such systems, because of their extensive periods of governing, 
to conflate the state and its resources with those of the party. Du Toit and de Jager (2014:11) 
argue that the cadre deployment strategy of the ANC (which permits the appointment of ANC 
loyalists to public service) has established a huge patronage network that blurs state-party lines. 
The effect is that state (public) resources are often used to further party objectives. By 
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extension, this conflation of state and party lines diminishes the quality of governance as “the 
ANC becomes conflated with the state in the minds of those deriving benefit from political 
appointments [and] material resources” (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:93).  
However, despite these shortcomings in South Africa’s democratic development, most studies 
agree that the state’s robust institutions and constitutionally guided democracy are indicative 
of favourable prospects for consolidation (Suttner, 2004; du Toit & de Jager, 2014; Lipton, 
2014). Here du Toit and de Jager (2014:108) note that, despite the disregard of certain political 
representatives with certain institutional rulings, the Constitution remains “broadly respected 
and the judiciary [remains] robust and impartial in its rulings”. Additionally, regardless of the 
fear around the incompatibility of party dominance with South Africa’s developing democracy, 
most authors recognize that the ANC has achieved electoral success broadly through the rules 
of the game. Bratton and Mattes (2001:449) observe that in relation to the basic procedural 
requirement of a democracy – that of free and fair elections – South Africa’s democracy has 
stabilized. Almost 20 years later, the procedural elements remain in place; while these are 
fundamental, they are not sufficient for a consolidated democracy. 
1.3 Problem Statement  
Given the limited inquiry into the contemporary state of South Africa’s democracy, 
characterised by ailing support for democracy amid growing perceptions of poor governance, 
maladministration and economic performance, this study will analyse and assess whether South 
Africa’s democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the 
Zuma administration; a consideration is also given as to whether poor governance served as an 
instigator in the facilitation of the deconsolidation process. The period of the Zuma 
administration is of particular interest as several events – prime amongst them being state 
capture – have demonstrated the conflation of the ruling party and state. Furthermore, the 
events associated with state capture not only reflect poor governance but demonstrate a gross 
disdain for constitutional rules and values. This disdain consequently led not only to the erosion 
of the state’s bureaucracy, but to what could be increasingly linked to a proliferating 
disaffection amongst South African citizenry with democratic governance. This growing 
disaffection of South Africans with democratic government has been met with an increasing 
concurrent appeal for non-democratic forms of government that are perceived to be able to 
deliver economic freedom in a way that democratic rule could apparently not do. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 8 
 
Accordingly, this study claims that South Africa’s democracy has deconsolidated, as continued 
poor governance and a tendency to subvert the rule of law by the Zuma administration resulted 
in dysfunctional intuitions and gross economic malaise; this in turn caused an erosion in 
support for democratic forms of governance, which is in turn increasingly associated with an 
openness towards non-democratic alternatives, as indicated by growing support for the EFF. 
Additionally, amid this growing radical disposition is a propensity to resort to violent political 
action in order to effect political action (change), which suggests that democracy in South 
Africa is in a process of deconsolidating. 
The significance of this study lies in its aim of providing greater insight into the current state 
of South Africa’s democracy using a holistic approach that considers attitudes, behaviours, 
structures and poor governance as collective conditions that potentially threaten South Africa’s 
democracy. In addition, this study is significant in that it considers (poor) governance as an 
instigator in facilitating the deconsolidation process, as opposed to considering governance as 
a condition of democratic deconsolidation. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Given the global trend towards democratic regression and the current (2008-2018) dire socio-
economic and political climate in South Africa, the central focus of this study is to determine, 
using the theoretical framework of democratic deconsolidation, whether South Africa’s 
democracy deconsolidated during the Zuma administration. As such, the central question of 
this study is: Did South Africa’s democracy deconsolidate structurally, attitudinally and 
behaviourally during the Zuma administration? In addition to the central question, the 
following sub-question will be addressed: was poor governance a key instigating factor in 
facilitating this process of deconsolidation? 
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
This study acknowledges that the notion of democratic deconsolidation is not only complex 
and multifaceted, but as yet relatively underdeveloped. Hence, by implication, any assessment 
on the basis of democratic deconsolidation will be a complex and tentative task. Therefore, this 
study adopts a normative analytical approach in an attempt to answer the research questions 
and provide an assessment of the state of South Africa’s democracy. As such, the research 
design of this study includes the use of an analytical framework which is an adaptation of the 
framework on the foundations of democratic consolidation provided by Schedler (2001) and 
by Foa and Mounk’s (2017) signs of democratic deconsolidation. While the broad foundations 
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of Schedler’s (2001) work –  behavioural, structural and attitudinal – will be used, the indicators 
that point to these foundations will be manipulated according to an inverse-looking focus on 
the prospects of regime consolidation. In other words, pessimistic theoretical deductions which 
indicate conditions that prevent democratic consolidation will be used to formulate the 
conditions of democratic deconsolidation within the analytical framework. This means that the 
analytical framework of democratic deconsolidation applied here will divert from Schedler 
(2001) by pointing to conditions that cause democratic regression or decay. Additionally, the 
indicators employed within these conditions will also divert slightly from Schedler (2001) as 
in his framework the subversion of the rule of law forms part of the behavioural component, 
while this section is a standalone feature of the structural component of the democratic 
deconsolidation framework. 
Another noteworthy change is that, while Schedler (2001) provides thorough foundations for 
the factors that make up a consolidated democracy, an additional component will be added to 
the framework of democratic deconsolidation – poor governance. This is because poor 
governance as a theme in democratic discourse has often been associated with democratic 
regress; however, poor governance as an instigator of democratic deconsolidation has yet to be 
thoroughly investigated. 
Ultimately, by employing the macro components provided by Schedler (2001) – behavioural, 
structural and attitudinal – and adapting them through combining theories of consolidation and 
deconsolidation to provide a framework of democratic deconsolidation serves as both a flexible 
and multidimensional analytical tool for providing a holistic assessment the status of 
democratic regimes. See figure 1.1. 
As the focus of this study is on South Africa, it will employ a qualitative case study research 
design. This design was chosen in that it allows for a wealth and depth of insights through a 
single-focus analysis. Utilising a single case enables a thorough analysis in attempting to 
answer the research questions. As such, this design allows this study to perform a more 
comprehensive and thorough analysis. As Neuman (2014:42) notes, a single case study design 
is advantageous for “identifying variables that are of the greatest interest and move towards 
their core or essential meaning in abstract theory”. Hence a single case study design allows for 
greater insight through an in-depth focus on specific mechanisms of the case study, which 
further enables this study to potentially build or expand theory (Lambrechts, 2014:252). 
Essentially the value of this design as it pertains to the research question is that it could provide 
insight into and detailed descriptions of specific cases.  
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Although a single case study design was considered most appropriate for this specific study, 
the researcher is aware that this design could present problems of inherent biases that could 
filter into the study (Lambrechts, 2014:252). The researcher is also aware that another 
disadvantage of this design is that generalisations as derived from research findings cannot be 
applied to broader contexts (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014:43). However, these disadvantages 
are thought to be overcome through using specific and narrow indicators of the conditions of 
democratic deconsolidation included in the analytical framework. Hence, by employing a 
flexible, multidimensional and multi-theoretical framework, the problem of biases and 
generalisations inherent in case study designs can be overcome.  
1.5.1 Concepts and Analytical Framework of Democratic Deconsolidation 
The outlined research design implies that the analytical framework will function as a data-
reduction strategy by organising the data according to the analytical conditions as set out in 
figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1. 1: Potential Deconsolidation Path of South Africa’s Democracy 
1.5.1.1 Poor Governance 
The condition of poor governance broadly concerns the functionality (or otherwise) of the 
regime’s government. It is understood that for a democracy to survive it requires a government 
that governs impartially – meaning that it exercises its authority without consideration of 
personal or special relationships or preferences (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:169). In the absence 
of such impartiality, government institutions will be drained of their democratic content, 
eventually degenerating into the abuse of office by using state sources in the interests of 
personal gain. According to Jou (2016:601-603) a poor quality of governance – understood as 
a lack of impartiality, high corruption, a bias or compromised judiciary and an ineffective 
administration – has the greatest influence in precipitating democratic deconsolidation. This is 
because the more citizens, particularly in new democracies, perceive the quality of governance 
to be low the more likely these citizens will be to withdraw support for a democratic regime 
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and potentially grant support of non-democratic2 alternatives. Similarly, Plattner (2016:64) 
contends that poor governance is considered the “first instance of the failure of many new 
democracies to build well-functioning and effective [institutions], which often leads to lagging 
economic growth, poor services, lack of personal security, and pervasive corruption”. As such, 
poor governance could be seen as the starting point of a deconsolidating democracy as it 
precipitates dysfunctional institutions, poor economic performance, lack of support for 
democracy (amongst citizens) and growing openness to non-democratic alternatives. 
Ultimately when democratic governments fail to govern impartially then the regime is likely 
to deconsolidate. 
1.5.1.2. Structural Condition 
The structural condition of democratic deconsolidation broadly concerns the structures – 
institutions and economy – that underpin a democratic regime. In relation to institutions, the 
structural condition of democratic deconsolidation posits that democracies are likely to 
deconsolidate when the rule of law is only partially applied and when political actors fail to be 
accountable. In relation to the economic development indicator, the structural condition 
generally purports that democracies with negative economic growth and a low gross domestic 
income per capita are more likely to deconsolidate (Schedler, 2001:81). 
1.5.1.3. Attitudinal Condition 
The attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation considers actors’ preferences for 
(desirability) and perceptions of democracy (Schedler, 2001:75). Studies show that when 
citizens value democracy instrumentally (as a means to an end) as opposed to intrinsically (for 
a process of legitimising government), then democracy is likely to deconsolidate (Mainwaring 
and Pérez-Liñán, 2013:126). However, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, these preferences and 
perceptions, whether intrinsic or instrumental, are highly subjective and often dependent on 
various conditions and factors. According to Diamond (1990:49), support for democracy, 
particularly in new democracies such as South Africa, is nurtured by effective government 
performance – that being government’s ability to deliver economic goods (jobs and basic social 
services) and political goods (civil liberties, equality before the law and human dignity). Jou 
(2016:603), while acknowledging the importance of governments economic performance, 
contends that ultimately in new democracies, quality of government – as it pertains to 
                                                 
2 De Jager and Steenekamp (2019:11) define non-democratic as relating to dictatorship, technocracies, and 
military rule.  
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government being honest, effective and law-abiding – has the greatest influence in stimulating 
support for democracy. As mentioned, this is because the more citizens view governments as 
being corrupt, non-abiding to law and ineffective in driving economic performance, the more 
likely these citizens become to not only question the regime’s legitimacy but also to withdraw 
support of the regime; potentially granting support to non-democratic alternative regime types 
(Jou, 2016:605). When there is a consideration for non-democratic alternatives in the minds of 
the citizenry then democracy can no longer be regarded as ‘the only game in town’.  
 1.5.1.4. Behavioural Condition 
The behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation largely relates to an adherence to 
(conforming with/abiding by) the rules of a democratic game – that is, an acceptance of the 
constitution, its principles and values. This adherence relates to both electoral rules and 
requirements as well as using democratic forms of political participation. Accordingly, 
democracies are seen to deconsolidate when political actors fail to accept electoral outcomes 
or use alternative anti-democratic measures to effect political change. In other words, when 
actors use violence to effect political change, then a democracy is likely to deconsolidate. 
1.5.1.5 Democracy and Democratic Deconsolidation 
The term democracy is a complex and multifaceted concept; however, it is impossible to 
discuss democratic deconsolidation without first providing a conceptualisation of democracy. 
In conceptualising democracy scholars have distinguished between thin (minimal) and thick 
(maximal) conception of the term. In terms of the former, definitions often centre on electoral 
competition and uncertainty. Schumpeter (1942:269) contends that democracy refers to an 
“institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. Conversely, thicker 
conceptions contend that procedural aspects of electoral competition are insufficient to declare 
a regime a democracy. Rather, maximal conceptions are more fully articulated and include a 
host of processes, conditions, and institutional arrangements including: judicial independence, 
local autonomy, majority rule, separation of powers, jury trails, socio-economic equality, 
public-spirited harmony, constitutionalism, good governance, government responsiveness, and 
the like (Graham, 2013:22-23).  
However, du Toit and de Jager (2014:110) contend that democracy does not necessarily equate 
to good governance or elements of the rule of law as many democracies “languish in poverty 
and suffer human rights abuses under so-called democratic systems”. A distinction, therefore, 
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must be made between democracy and bureaucratic, institutional, governmental, civic, and 
other types of arrangements. Thus, this study maintains that democracy refers to the access to 
public authority on the basis of popular consensus (the occupying of government) which is 
separate from institutional arrangements (rule of law), good governance (impartiality), civic 
attitude (intrinsic support), and behavioural considerations (democratic behaviour) (Rothstein 
& Teorell, 2008:169).  
Furthermore, this study draws on the inverse of Linz and Stepan’s (1996:18) definition of 
democratic consolidation by contending that democracies deconsolidate when the regime is – 
by way of poor governance – unable to solve a set of problems and a minority of actors begin 
to appeal to non-democratic alternatives and these former supporters of democracy begin to 
behave undemocratically. This definition is useful in that it indicates the various phases of 
democratic deconsolidation: when poor governance erodes institutions capacity to function 
effectively, thereby being unable to facilitate the rules of the game, when citizens no longer 
grant their support to the regime, and when citizens behave undemocratically by using non-
democratic means to effect political change, then democracies deconsolidate.  
Data Sources and Collection 
As this is a desk-top case study, the methodology employed, as influenced by the analytical 
framework, will involve the collection, review of, and reliance on secondary data sources. 
These sources will be gathered as follows: 
 I. Books and Peer-Reviewed Academic Journals 
- Sourced from Stellenbosch University library databases 
- Google scholar 
II. Investigation Reports 
- The State of Capture report sourced from the Office of the Public Protector’s website 
- Secure in Comfort report sourced from the Office of the Public Protector’s website 
- Investigation Report, Prestige Project A: Security Measures, President’s Private 
Residence sourced from the Department of Public Works website 
- Government Gazette (report on Nkandla) sourced from the Special Investigative Unit’s 
website 
- Eskom Inquiry Reference Book sourced from the Public Affairs Research Institute’s 
website 
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- Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen report sourced from the 
Public Affairs Research Institute’s website 
- Denton’s Report sourced from Denton’s website 
- Mokogoro Commission Report sourced from the Presidency’s website. 
III. Statistics & Statistical Reports 
- Various reports measuring support for democracy and support for non-democratic 
alternatives in the South African context sourced from Afrobarometer website. 
- Budget Review 2019 sourced from the National Treasury’s website. 
- Quarterly Labour Force Surveys 2017 and 2018 sourced from Statistics South Africa’s 
website. 
- Reports on South Africa’s economic performance during the Zuma administration 
sourced from the South African Institute of International Affairs. 
- Reports on voting behaviour in South Africa sourced from the Independent Electoral 
Commission of South Africa’s website. 
- Reports measuring violent protest action sourced from the South African Institute of 
Race Relations and South African Institute of Security Studies. 
IV. Final rulings on Nkandla-related cases sourced from the Constitutional Court’s website 
V. Other Media Sources 
- Press statements from the website of the Presidency 
- Mail and Guardian articles 
- City Press articles 
1.6 Delimitation and Limitations of the Study 
This study is chronologically delimited to assess the state of South Africa’s democracy during 
the Zuma administration, that is, between the ten years 2008 until 2018. Delimiting the study 
to cover this period not only allows for an in-depth and thorough analysis, but avoids the 
analysis being conflated with South Africa’s immediate post-1994 to 2000 transition and 
reform period. Given that the theories within the theoretical framework are based on mature 
democracies implies that more appropriate assessment can be done within this ten-year period, 
as by 2007 South Africa’s democracy had moved beyond its transition phase towards an 
entrenchment of democratic rule. 
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Additionally, this study recognises that the notion of democracy and by extension its 
assessment are complicated by virtue of their multidimensionality. Thus, while it is 
acknowledged that each condition within the chosen theoretical framework caters to a broader 
and often autonomous field of debate, but as this study is limited by space constraints, it will 
adapt elements of existing theoretical frameworks in an attempt to be as exacting as possible 
within the chosen theoretical framework. This study is also limited to what can be achieved 
during the research period of two years using secondary sources only. 
1.7 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical situations are a significant starting point for any research undertaking. Ethical 
considerations in the social sciences are not uncommon, even though they may perhaps be less 
dramatic and complex than those found in medical science, for example (Kellstedt & Whitten, 
2013:81). As this study was conducted at Stellenbosch University, it falls under the scope of 
the institution’s Framework Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable 
Research at Stellenbosch University (2009). Accordingly, because this study relies solely on 
research based on secondary sources accessible in the public domain and does not involve any 
engagement of further human participation, it was considered to be low risk in terms of ethical 
considerations. Consequently, this study was considered exempt from ethical review by the 
Research Ethics Committee (REC): Humanities under the project number POLSCI-2018-6993.   
1.8 Chapter Outline 
This chapter has outlined the study background, rational and methodology; the remainder of 
this thesis is described in the following chapter outline. 
Chapter 2 consists of a review of the literature on democratic (de)consolidation, which will be 
organised systematically for the purposes of developing an analytical framework to be used to 
analyse the case of South Africa. The chapter serves as an analytical tool utilised in the 
subsequent chapters in order to offer a response to the research questions on democratic 
deconsolidation. 
Chapter 3 builds on Chapter 2 by providing a contextualisation (of the inception and tenor of 
the Zuma administration) within which an analysis could be undertaken. After laying a 
contextual foundation, the chapter then proceeds to apply the first lens of analysis – poor 
governance. This is done in order to address the secondary research question by assessing the 
potential of poor governance as the instigator of the deconsolidation process in South Africa. 
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In keeping with the analysis started in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 applies the subsequent three 
conditions – structural, attitudinal and behavioural – of democratic deconsolidation during the 
Zuma administration (2008-2018). The central purpose of this chapter is to provide findings in 
response to the primary research question. As such, this chapter provides an assessment of 
whether South Africa’s democracy deconsolidated under the Zuma Administration.  
Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes and examines the findings of this research project. In addition, 
this chapter provides recommendations for future study within the field of this research.  
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Chapter II – Development of the Analytical Framework of Democratic Deconsolidation 
2.1 Introduction 
The first chapter established the research questions and rationale for the study. It was shown 
that, although the South African case has received much attention in the way of democratic 
consolidation analysis, there is limited inquiry using a holistic approach, and the theories and 
lenses of the proliferating field of democratic deconsolidation have not been applied. To bridge 
this gap, this chapter provides a review of the growing literature on conditions of democratic 
deconsolidation and organises it systematically through the development of an analytical 
framework which could be utilized to analyse the case of South Africa.  
The field of democratic deconsolidation studies finds its roots in the field of democratic 
consolidation. This latter field predominantly occupies itself with conditions necessary for the 
entrenchment of (new and established) democracies, and which make these regimes more 
immune against the threat of authoritarian regression (Schedler, 1998:91). The scholarship on 
democratic consolidation falls into broadly two categories: authors who study democracies 
optimistically or pessimistically. In relation to the former, authors predominantly focus on 
conditions that are conducive to ensuring that a democracy becomes so deeply entrenched that 
it comes to constitute “the only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996:15). In contrast, authors 
who study democratic survival pessimistically place more emphasis on conditions which 
prevent democratic entrenchment and consolidation (Schedler, 1998:92).  
Alternatively stated, the study of democratic deconsolidation could be understood as a 
divergence model which adopts a more “backsliding-focused and pessimistic” outlook on the 
prospects of regime consolidation (Ágh, 2016:16). This is in contrast to democratic 
consolidation studies, which offers a convergence model which presupposes that, despite 
setbacks within the democratic process, democracies could overcome these and would be more 
likely to consolidate (Ágh, 2016:16).  
The distinction between authors who side with either the convergent or divergent perspective 
is reflective of the way in which a democratic state progresses or regresses. In other words, a 
democratic state progresses according to a “continuum of democraticness” in which the regime 
could move forward by changing from authoritarianism into a semi-democratic dispensation 
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and then into a liberal democracy (Schedler, 1998:93).3 Alternatively, a democratic regime 
could regress from being an established liberal democracy to an unstable democracy, which is 
prone to deconsolidate and potentially fully erode to an authoritarian state (Schedler, 1998:93). 
It is this state of regression, demonstrated by many democracies in these last few decades, that 
has prompted a pessimistic outlook on the inquiry into the survival prospects of democracies.  
This chapter will be divided into two broad sections. The first section provides a 
conceptualisation of democratic deconsolidation. The second section sets out the analytical 
framework which will be adopted from the work of Schedler (2001), who indicated three 
conditions of democratic (de)consolidation – structural, attitudinal and behavioural – which 
encompass indicators that could be used analytically to assess the prospects of democratic 
survival. These three conditions, which serve as the skeleton and organisational structure of 
the framework, will be supplemented with other theories on democratic (de)consolidation such 
as Foa and Mounk’s (2017) Signs of Deconsolidation, amongst others. Furthermore, as 
explained in the previous chapter, poor governance as a theme in democratic discourse has 
often been associated with democratic regress; however, poor governance as an instigator of 
democratic deconsolidation has yet to be thoroughly interrogated. This chapter will fill this gap 
by arguing for poor governance as an instigator to the process of democratic deconsolidation. 
Hence, this framework will include an instigator and three concomitant conditions of 
democratic deconsolidation: poor governance, structural, attitudinal and behavioural. It is 
acknowledged that there is fluidity between these conditions of democratic deconsolidation.  
2.2 A Conceptualisation of Democratic Deconsolidation 
As the literature on democratic deconsolidation has its roots in the literature on democratic 
consolidation, so too the conceptualisation of the former is derived from the latter. Various 
studies of democratic consolidation accept Linz and Stepan’s (1996:15) conception that a 
democratic regime is consolidated when it constitutes “the only game in town” (Diamond, 
1997a; Schedler, 1998, 2001; O’Donnell, 1996, Foa & Mounk, 2017). In other words, a 
democracy is considered consolidated when democratic forms of state institutions, a vibrant 
civil society, elections, and democratic rules and principles become embedded within society 
(Carothers, 2002:7). Essentially, there is a broad consensus that democracies are consolidated 
when democratic values and principles become deeply internalised in the “social, institutional 
                                                 
3 Carothers (2002) argues that democracies should be analysed using standardised indicators (a democratic 
paradigm) as opposed to the specific context and nature of the regime.  
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and psychological” life and a sizeable majority of citizens commit themselves to the regime 
and accept it as the best form of government regardless of the economic, political and social 
perils it faces (Linz & Stepan, 1996:17; O’Donnell, 1996; Schedler, 1998, 2001; Carothers, 
2002).  
While a regime is consolidated when it is embraced as ‘the only game in town’, so too does a 
regime deconsolidate when it “ceases to be the only game in town” (Foa & Mounk, 2017:9). 
In other words, Foa and Mounk (2017:9) contend that democracies deconsolidate when “at 
some later point, a sizeable minority of citizens loses its belief in democratic values, becomes 
attracted to authoritarian alternatives and starts to flout or oppose constitutive elements of 
liberal democracy”. In other words, when political actors reject democratic norms and become 
disaffected by democratic mechanisms and processes while appealing to authoritarian regime 
types, then democracy is seen to deconsolidate. 
However, a shift in support for the regime (change in attitudes) is not enough to consider a 
democracy as deconsolidated. Rather, a multitude of conditions precede a shift in attitudes that 
cause democracies to deconsolidate. Therefore, this study draws on the inverse of Linz and 
Stepan’s (1996:18) definition of democratic consolidation by contending that democracies 
deconsolidate when the regime is – by way of poor governance – unable to solve a set of 
problems and a minority of actors begin to appeal to non-democratic alternatives and these 
former supporters of democracy begin to behave undemocratically. This definition is useful in 
that it indicates the various phases of democratic deconsolidation: when poor governance 
erodes institutions capacity to function effectively, thereby being unable to facilitate the rules 
of the game, when citizens no longer grant their support to the regime, and when citizens 
behave undemocratically by using non-democratic means to effect political change, then 
democracies deconsolidate.  
Before proceeding with the development of the analytical framework, it should be 
acknowledged that democratic deconsolidation is not the antithesis of democratic 
consolidation. In other words, democratic deconsolidation does not refer to a total reversion of 
the regime to authoritarianism, but rather denotes the process of democratic decline, 
backsliding and regression. These terms will be used to refer to the slow death of democracy 
in which a democratic regime gradually disintegrates and diverges from democratic ideals 
(according to the continuum) thereby moving closer to authoritarianism and further away from 
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liberal democracy (Schedler, 1998:94). In this study democratic deconsolidation refers to 
democratic regimes which are in a state of regression rather than completely broken-down. 
2.3 Analytical Framework of Democratic Deconsolidation 
2.3.1 Instigator - Poor Governance 
Much of the recently observed trend of civic fatigue and disillusionment within democratic 
regimes is the consequence of poor governance (Plattner, 2016:4). Jou (2016:601-603) 
contends that a poor quality of governance – understood as high levels of corruption, a 
compromised judiciary and an ineffective bureaucracy – has the greatest influence in 
precipitating democratic deconsolidation. This is because the more citizens (particularly in 
newly established democracies where diffused support is not yet cultivated) perceive 
governments to be corrupt, non-abiding to law and ineffective, the more likely these citizens 
are to not only question the regime’s legitimacy but also to withdraw support of the regime; 
potentially offering support to non-democratic regime types (Jou, 2016:605). Similarly, 
Plattner (2016:64) contends that poor governance is considered the “first instance of the failure 
of many new democracies to build well-functioning and effective [institutions], which often 
leads to lagging economic growth, poor services, lack of personal security, and pervasive 
corruption”. Accordingly, poor governance could be seen as the starting point of a 
deconsolidating democracy as it leads to dysfunctional institutions, poor economic 
performance, lack of support for democracy (amongst citizens) and growing openness to non-
democratic alternatives. 
This means that an assessment of the state of a democracy on the basis of its longevity cannot 
be undertaken in isolation from questions of democratic governance (Diamond & Morlino, 
2005:21). Rather, an assessment of democratic longevity necessitates a consideration of 
democratic governance as it relates to the procedures of a democratic regime, democratic action 
and extends to the results that democratic regimes produce (Diamond & Morlino, 2004:12; du 
Toit & de Jager, 2012:12).  
Before defining governance, it should be acknowledged that it is not possible to equate 
democracy with good governance (du Toit & de Jager, 2012:111). Democratic regimes, while 
electorally institutionalising democratic principles, often lack the necessary good governance 
to consolidate. Du Toit and de Jager (2012:111) argue that “dysfunctional government 
institutions, even within democratic regimes”, often result in economic and social malaise, 
which could cause a democratic regime to deconsolidate.  
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Consequently, it is necessary to make a distinction between democracy and good governance. 
Rothstein and Teorell (2008:169) contend that while democracy refers to access to public 
authority (the occupying of government), good governance refers to the exercise of this 
authority (the practice of governing impartially). Alternatively stated, whereas political 
equality (equal opportunity to participate in the making of government) acts as a norm for 
legitimising the democratic regime, good governance (governing impartially and ensuring 
equal representation) acts as a norm for legitimising political authority within the regime. Good 
governance is thus understood as the procedural norm of impartiality exercised in government 
and state institutions (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:169). Impartiality is defined as acting without 
persuasion or consideration of personal (special) relationships or preferences (Rothstein & 
Teorell, 2008:169). Sharma (2007:32) contends that good governance encompasses all aspects 
of the way a country is governed. Good governance relates to participatory, consensus-
orientated, accountable, transparent, responsive, inclusive and effective government (Sharma, 
2007:32).  
In line with this, du Toit and de Jager (2012:112) contend that an important aspect of good 
governance entails a separation or jurisdictional boundary that divides state and government. 
The state is expected to be a neutral arbiter, while the government temporarily exercises 
authority in the state. When there is a blurring of lines between the state and government, the 
principle of impartiality is undermined by a biased government – unrepresentative of the people 
–  thereby subverting the component of broad representation that characterises democracy. 
In this regard, du Toit and de Jager (2014:109) note that dominant party systems (such as South 
Africa’s), because of one-party’s prolonged period of being in government, are particularly at 
risk of conflating their identity with that of the state. Brooks (2004:3) remarks that when one 
party dominates and governs for an extensive period without the prospect of electoral defeat, 
concerns arise around the “possibility of declining government response to public opinion, loss 
of accountability and the overall erosion of democratic principles”. Pempel (1990:7) states that 
when a dominant party in government can utilise state resources to suit its agenda to “reshape 
society in its own image; to reward its adherents and to deny such rewards to its opponents”, 
then it has the potential power to exclude the interests of minorities within the citizenry.  
For du Toit and de Jager (2014:109) the conflation of government and state can occur through 
a myriad of ways, including controlling ideology in an uncontested way; projecting an 
interpretation of history (especially an historical event from which the party’s dominance was 
derived), setting policy and public agenda and, most significantly, assigning party loyalists to 
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positions within the state (thereby effectively capturing the state’s bureaucracy). This issue of 
conflation could be understood as pertaining to the use and abuse of state resources for the 
purposes of augmenting personal aims. It is at this level of dominance where the quality of 
democracy is affected in that the autonomy of the state is eroded. When the state loses its 
autonomy, it also loses it neutrality, which further implies that the state cannot function in the 
interests of the public at large. When there is a blurring of state, party lines through a capturing 
of the state’s resources, its structural framework and its institutions, then these resources can 
be used for partisan ends (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:111). Whereas a system of good governance 
that exercises authority impartially (separates government and state) is conducive to democratic 
consolidation, dominant systems that capture the state, its institutional framework and 
resources are likely to edge closer to democratic deconsolidation.  
Essentially when it comes to democracies, poor governance - that centres on partisanship, 
corruption, non-abiding to law and ineffective bureaucracies – is highly likely to generate into 
democratic deconsolidation. This is not only because poor governance tends to drain 
democratic institutions of their democratic content and cause economic peril but moreover 
because when citizens perceive the quality of governance to be low, they become more inclined 
to withdraw their support for the regime and more receptive to granting support to non-
democratic alternatives. When governments fail to govern impartially then democracies 
deconsolidate. 
2.3.2 Structural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation 
The structural condition of democratic deconsolidation largely concerns the institutions that 
underpin a democratic regime as well as the economic outcomes that a democracy produces. 
An assessment of the institutional component of the structural condition of democratic 
deconsolidation requires a consideration of the lack of establishment of the rule of law, 
institutional capacity and accountability. This is because these structures set out the rules for 
the effective functioning of the democratic game. Furthermore, the economic component of the 
structural condition of democratic deconsolidation concerns the poor performance of the 
economy. Accordingly, economic outcomes require an audit of the economic development and 
performance of the economy within the regime, as without material improvement the demos 
may become inclined to forgo political empowerment for the sake of economic freedom. 
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2.3.2.1 The Rule of Law, Institutional Capacity and Accountability 
According to O’Donnell (2005:3), the rule of law is considered an essential pillar upon which 
any high-quality democracy rests. This is because the rule of law serves as a foundation upon 
which democratic rights, responsibilities and obligations are assigned to political actors and 
institutions for the purposes of organising their engagement and interaction according to 
democratic norms and principles.  
The rule of law is generally understood as providing legal guarantees which ensure that all 
citizens are equal before the law (this emphatically includes public officials) (Linz & Stepan, 
1996; O’Donnell, 2005:33). This not only relates to participatory rights and political freedom 
(by means of voting) but also includes the freedoms of expression, association and movement, 
and the like (O’Donnell, 2005:4). O’Donnell (2005:3) contends that for this to be achieved the 
rule of law must be premised on “political rights, civil liberties and mechanisms of 
accountability that affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of 
state power”. The rule of law, coupled with independent and impartial governing institutions 
and a judiciary that guards against the abuse of political authority and performs effectively, is 
paramount to ensuring the longevity of a democratic regime. In a liberal democracy this is 
exemplified through the implementation of a constitution that ensures transparency and 
accountability (Mottair, 2002). The rule of law could thus be seen to work intimately and 
inseparably with other aspects of a democratic dispensation (O’Donnell, 2005:3).   
For Diamond and Morlino (2005:xiv) a consolidating democracy possesses “a strong, vigorous, 
diffuse, and self-sustaining rule of law in the following respects: 
• The rule of law is equally enforced toward everyone, including state officials; 
no one is above the law; 
• The legal state is supreme throughout the country, leaving no areas dominated 
by organised crime, local oligarch, or political bosses who are above the law; 
• Corruption is minimised, detected, and punished, in the political administrative, 
and judicial branches of state; 
• At all levels, the state bureaucracy applies the laws competently, efficiently, 
and universally, and assumes responsibility in the event of an error; 
• The police force is professional, efficient, and respectful of individuals’ legally 
guaranteed rights and freedoms, including rights of due process; 
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• Citizens have equal and unhindered access to the courts to defend their rights 
and to contest lawsuits between private citizens or between private citizens and 
public institutions; 
• Criminal cases and civil and administrative lawsuits are heard and resolved 
expeditiously; 
• The judiciary at all levels is neutral and independent from any political 
influence; 
• Rulings of the courts are respected and enforced by other agencies of the state; 
and,  
• The constitution is supreme and is interpreted and defended by a constitutional 
court.” 
Collectively, these aspects serve to constitute the rules and framework within which civil 
society and political actors as well as institutions within a democratic regime functions and 
engages. Essentially, the rule of law could be seen to constitute the rules of the democratic 
game.  
In the absence of a stringent rule of law and an independent judiciary, the rights, dignity and 
equality of citizens are not only at risk, but the rules of the democratic game also become 
vulnerable to manipulation of powerful political actors (O’Donnell, 2005:3). According to 
Diamond and Morlino (2005:xv), when the rule of law is weak and applied partially, then the 
participation of minority or marginalised actors in civil society is supressed; individual rights 
become fleeting, access to power becomes skewed and available only to those who dominate, 
and corruption and abuse of power become rampant. Additionally, accountability is subverted, 
political competition distorted, and democratic institutions eroded (Diamond & Morlino, 
2005:xv). Hence, when the rule of law fails to bolster and buttress these democratic 
components of equity and accountability, then the responsiveness of government to the needs 
and interests of the people cannot be achieved (O’Donnell, 2005:3). Ultimately, a rule of law 
that is partially applied allows for cheating the rules of the game, which can exacerbate and 
cause democratic deconsolidation.  
However, the rule of law does not function in a vacuum. On the contrary, the institutions 
responsible for upholding the rule of law are of paramount importance as they function as a 
medium for cultivating democratic values and behaviour among elites as well as citizens 
(Diamond, 1997a:15). Studies such as those by Diamond (1997b), Weingst (1997), Adserà and 
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Boix (2008), among others, postulate that institutional structures are fundamental to democratic 
survival as they function to uphold the rules and constraints that shape human interactions by 
providing incentives for actors to either adhere to or disobey the rules of the game. When 
institutions are fragile, in that effective mechanisms for power-checking are absent, the benefits 
of subverting democratic rules are increased, which often prompts actors to resort to 
undemocratic behaviour in pursing their political objectives (Adserà & Boix, 2008:3; Kapstein 
& Converse, 2008:62). Consequently, where political officials have a monopoly on decision-
making power and have autonomous capacity to act on these decisions without any 
accountability, the problems of rigged elections, unconstitutional changes and corruption 
become more commonplace and jeopardise democratic survival (Johnston, 1992:11-12). 
Johnston (1992:30) warns that when actions such as corruption and election rigging become 
embedded within the democratic system, new undemocratic institutions and forms of 
participation could emerge that further embeds the process of democratic deconsolidation. 
Institutions play an essential role in the process of consolidation as they serve to orientate and 
habituate actors to the democratic behavioural dispositions of moderation and tolerance. 
However, where institutions are fragile and present incentives towards undemocratic 
dispositions and behaviours, democracy deconsolidates. 
The rule of law in large part relates to the principle of impartiality as described in the 
governance condition of democratic deconsolidation. This is because the rule of law relates to 
“a set of stable political rules and rights impartially applied to all citizens” (Weingast, 
1997:245).  The rule of law embodies the principle of the application of equality equally applied 
to all. Independent and impartial institutions that exercise good governance by upholding the 
rule of law are essential in building a democracy because they foster public trust, legitimacy 
and positive economic outcomes (Jou, 2016:596). These elements are therefore not only 
necessary in ensuring democratic stability, but also essential in fostering public legitimacy so 
that a democracy can thrive (consolidate). Without these elements, democratic institutions 
become vulnerable to elite manipulation and abuse of power, and consequently they become 
drained of their democratic content. 
Related to the abstract issue of the rule of law is the practical capacity of institutions of 
government to enforce and uphold it. Graham (2012:59) contends that if democracies are to 
function effectively, then institutions and the governing administration must ensure that there 
is high-quality legislation in place (that is effectively implemented), transparency in the policy-
making process, and an impartial, accountable and efficient state bureaucracy. 
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Another element linked to the rule of law and effective institutions is elite accountability. 
Democracy, by virtue of entailing rule by the people, is distinguishable by its emphasis on 
accountability. Accountability in this context could be understood as “an exchange of 
responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens” (Schmitter, 2004:47). 
Accountability is premised on the separation of powers between the three branches of 
government – the executive, legislature and judiciary – as well as regular free and fair elections 
and constitutionalism (Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999:222). Diamond and Morlino (2005:8) 
argue that in democracies there are two forms of accountability: vertical accountability and 
horizontal accountability. The former relates to the obligation and responsibility that elected 
leaders have regarding their political decisions towards citizen-electors or constitutional bodies 
(Diamond & Morlino 2005:8). Horizontal accountability refers to the obligation of government 
to account to institutional actors that ensure the checks and balances remain in place – those 
who possess legal authority to control or sanction government behaviour (Diamond & Morlino, 
2005:8). These conditions of accountability, whether vertical or horizontal, are important to the 
functioning of a consolidating democratic regime, for when the public or state institutions are 
unwilling to scrutinize and/or prosecute one another, then democratic regimes are vulnerable 
to democratic deconsolidation. 
The rule of law, encompassing its various aspects of judicial independence, civil liberties, 
impartial governing institutions and accountability, essentially constitutes the rules of the 
democratic game that contextualise, shape, and legitimise the interaction between political 
actors within a democratic regime. When the rule of law is applied partially, judicial 
independence compromised and civil society fatigued, then the opportunity arises to cheat in 
the game by allowing power to become corrupt, participation to be skewed and performance to 
become ineffective. Hence, by implication, democratic regimes become vulnerable to 
democratic deconsolidation. 
2.3.2.2 Economic Outcomes: Development and Performance 
The ability of a democracy to secure and deliver basic social and economic goods to the public 
is necessary for it to remain a well-functioning and consolidating regime. Without economic 
development and growth, citizens may become inclined to forgo democratic freedom in 
exchange for economic freedom (further elaborated under the attitudinal condition). Therefore, 
the level of economic development and growth has a strong bearing on the durability of 
democracy. When there are high levels of economic development (affluence), democracy is 
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more likely to flourish, while conversely, low levels of economic development make the regime 
more likely to deconsolidate.  
There is a broad consensus in which authors such as Cutright (1963), Olsen (1968), Bollen 
(1979), Huntington (1991) and Diamond (1993), to mention a few, agree with Lipset’s 
(1959:75) famous dictum that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that 
[democracy] will [be] sustained”. It should be recognised that Lipset (1959) suggests that 
economic growth is a necessary (prerequisite) condition for democratisation. Inglehart 
(2016:21) argues that economic development promotes democratisation and its durability by 
creating an enlarged educated and articulate middle class and, moreover, transforms social and 
cultural values that give priority to the freedom of political choice and freedom of expression. 
The prevailing idea is that wealthy nations promote the kinds of socio-economic development 
that serves democracy by producing cultural values that make citizens more demanding of and 
receptive to democratic norms.  
Lipset (1959:72), in tracing indices of economic development such as the level of wealth, 
industrialisation, urbanisation, and education, postulates that the higher the level of income per 
capita and the greater the degree of modernisation, the more likely it would be that a democracy 
would consolidate. Przeworksi, Alvarez, Chiebub and Limongi (1996:41) operationalize this 
position, by arguing that rich democracies with a per capita income that exceeds 6 000 USD 
are “impregnable and can be expected to live forever”. However, Meintjies (2011:34) 
recognises that this income figure is based on the constant purchasing power parity of the dollar 
in 1985 and thus adjusted this for inflation based on the 2010 United States Bureau of Labour 
Statistics. Meintjies (2011:34) therefore contends that democracies with a per capita income 
that exceeds 12 195.78 USD are more likely to consolidate.  
Democracies, it seems, are more prone to backsliding when there are low levels of economic 
development. This notion is supported by various studies such as Lipset (1959), Przeworski, et 
al. (1996), Bernhard, Reenock and Nordshom (2003), to mention a few. Przeworski, et al. 
(1996:41) contend that democracies with an annual per capita income below 1 000 USD are 
extremely fragile. In the light of the adjusted figure, Meintjies (2011:34) contends that 
democracies with a per capita income of between 12 195 USD and 2 032 USD are fragile, 
while democracies with a per capita income lower than 2 032 USD are extremely fragile. 
Przeworski, et al. (1996:45) found that democracies confronted with a decline in income are 
three times more likely to deconsolidate than democracies which experience the opposite. 
Moreover, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000:109) found that there is a one in 
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135 chance that democracy will regress when incomes fail to grow during any three or more 
consecutive years. The argument prevails that democratic deaths follow a clear pattern and will 
be more commonplace when countries experience poor economic growth.  
Authors also occupy themselves with the impact of a malfunctioning economy on regime 
instability (Diskin, Diskin & Hazan 2005:293). Commentators such as Haggard and Kaufmann 
(1994), Diamond (1999), Przeworksi et al., (2000), and Lindvall (2012), to mention a few, 
agree that democracies are extremely likely to deconsolidate when confronted with an 
economic crisis, which is often seen to undermine a democratic regime. Broad strands of the 
literature indicate that sluggish economic growth which manifests as an economic crisis also 
weakens the prospects for democratic durability and often causes democratic regression. 
Haggard and Kaufmann (1994:7) argue that countries dealing with prolonged periods of 
economic decline often experience democratic institutions being drained of their democratic 
content (legitimacy), thereby leading to deconsolidation. Haggard and Kaufmann (1994:7) 
indicate that prolonged periods of poor economic performance intensify political cynicism, 
whereby there is an erosion of faith in the capacity of democratic governments to manage the 
crisis, which is compounded by a failure to generate stable and representative ruling coalitions 
(Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994:7). This results in knock-on effects such as increased crime, civil 
violence and organised revolutionary activity (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994:7). Consequently, 
democracies are undermined and become internally destabilised as internal civic violence, 
crime and riots erupt, thus speaking to its behavioural ramifications, as will be discussed 
shortly. 
Authors such as Dahl (1983), Lamounier (1999), Przeworski et al. (2000), Nylen (2000) and 
Schedler (2001), to mention a few, agree that economic inequality tends to subvert democracy, 
often causing it to regress. Lamounier (1999:172) contends that high levels of socio-economic 
disparity have posed a constant challenge to democratic institutions. Dahl (1989:98) argues 
that economic destitution and inequality subvert the minimal conditions necessary to exercise 
democratic citizenship effectively. This could be related to the point made by Lipset (1959), 
who contended that it is only in a wealthy society with relatively low levels of poverty that 
citizens are sophisticated and educated enough to make effective political decisions. Rubinson 
and Quinlan (1977) show that states with high levels of income inequality have a small and 
weak middle class, which implies that a democratic regime would not be sought after there. 
Hence, within a highly unequal economy, citizens from the lower strata of society would be 
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more prone to forfeit democratic values and political choice for a better distribution of 
economic benefits. 
2.3.3 Attitudinal Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation 
The attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation is largely concerned with the impact 
that actors’ preferences and perceptions of the regime have on democratic durability (Schedler, 
2001:75). This is because democracy could only be considered as ‘the only game in town’ 
when the citizenry endorses it as such – if they grant their support regardless of the socio-
economic or political circumstances. However, where citizens’ faith in democracy is not 
cemented and non-democratic alternatives are considered, then democracy is no longer seen as 
‘the only game in town’ – causing the regime to edge closer towards democratic 
deconsolidation. The attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation broadly anchors itself 
in the political attitudes of actors. The focus on political attitudes is to determine whether 
actors’ attitudes diverge from “the stability requirements of democratic [regimes]” (Schedler, 
2001:75).  
It is well understood that actors’ regime preferences matter for the survival of the regime (Linz 
& Stepan, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2012, 2013). However, 
this consensus is predicated on a debate centred on the nature of such preferences and these 
preferences concomitant impact on the prospects of regime durability (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; 
Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2012, 2013). Theoretical arguments generally range between 
diffuse and specific support. The former (diffuse support) is seen to consolidate a democratic 
regime, while the latter (specific support) precipitates democratic deconsolidation. Given this 
divergence, it is necessary to distinguish between the types of support in order to comprehend 
their respective impacts on regime durability.  
According to Easton (1975:436), diffuse support relates to a favourable disposition towards the 
regime regardless of unfavourable outputs that the regime produces. As defined by Easton 
(1975:444), diffuse support “consists of a reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that 
helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which 
they see as damaging to their wants”. In other words, while system outputs may vary (either 
being favourable or unfavourable) diffuse support remains constant. There remains a deep 
commitment to the regime regardless of whether system outputs are favourable or 
unfavourable. 
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Conversely, specific support is less durable than diffuse support in that it relates to “the 
satisfaction that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and 
performance of the political authorities” (Easton, 1975:437). Specific support hinges on 
whether system outputs and government performance satisfy the preferences (interests and 
expectations) of citizens with the regime. The performance of government has a deterministic 
effect in cultivating support for the system. As Easton (1975:437) notes, where perceived 
“decisions, policies, actions, utterances or general style of authorities” do not satisfy the 
interests (preferences) of citizens, this kind of support may not be generated, and the system 
will not endure.  
Similarly, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2012, 2013) distinguish between intrinsic and 
instrumental support. They contend that an intrinsic preference implies valuing a democratic 
regime for what it is (a process of conferring legitimacy) (2013:124). Bratton and Mattes 
(2001:448) argue that intrinsic support implies a commitment to the regime “for better or 
worse”. In other words, citizens maintain a belief that democracy is the best form of 
government despite any economic, political or social turbulence that may occur. This 
commitment to the regime is often expressed in actors’ willingness to accept unfavourable 
policy outcomes and even endure policies which hurt their interests (as demonstrative of their 
commitment). This is because these citizens deem the process through which those policies are 
formulated as legitimate (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013:126). Ultimately, an intrinsic 
preference for democracy implies valuing democracy as an end in itself (Anderson, 2009:215).  
In contrast, instrumental support is considered conditional and may be granted or (easily) 
withdrawn depending on “the tempter of the times” (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:448). Depending 
on the tangible or intangible conditions that democracy brings, support will be granted or 
withheld. This is because instrumental support is largely premised on an appreciation of the 
regime as a means to an end. That being the case, an appreciation of the regime is based on the 
quality of governance and economic capacity (its ability to correct material socio-economic 
inequalities rather than on its legitimising capacity) (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:448). Mainwaring 
and Pérez-Liñán (2013:126) contend that support would easily be granted on the condition that 
policies suit actor preferences. However, where polices are viewed as unsuitable, citizens may 
“succumb to the siren song of populist leaders who argue that economic development requires 
the sacrifice of political liberties” (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:448). Ultimately, instrumental 
support for democracy suggests support that is elusive, making the regime vulnerable by 
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implication of citizen’s willingness to consider democratic alternatives when the system 
encounters periods of economic or political peril.  
However, despite these variations in support for democracy, it should be acknowledged that 
support itself is highly subjective (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007:638). This is because actors’ 
attitudes toward the regime are derived from multiple sources (see Schedler, 2001:75; Schedler 
& Sarsfield, 2007:638). Almond and Verba (1963:13) argue that attitudes towards the regime 
align with attitudes towards the role of the self within the regime. This perspective underscores 
the importance of considering subjective valuations of political attitudes within the regime.  
Von Fintel and Ott (2017:80) note that “[the] subjective character is historically conditioned 
and shaped by the idiosyncrasies of the development of a given country and influences the 
congruency of a political culture [within] a political regime”. Individual political attitudes are 
often influenced by their evaluation of the performance and quality of governance, which 
serves as reference points for assessing the preferability of the regime. Diamond (1990:49) 
notes that while democracy necessitates support by the people to legitimise the regime as the 
best form of government, this legitimacy develops over time and is partly nurtured by effective 
performance and quality of government. This performance and quality of the government 
relates to the government’s ability to deliver both political and economic goods, where the 
former pertains to “civil liberties, political rights, human dignity and equality before the law 
[impartiality]” and the latter to “economic assets, jobs and an array of basic social services” 
(Bratton & Mattes, 2001:4). It should also be noted that both economic performance and 
support (legitimacy) are highly dependent on good governance (van Beek & de Jager, 2017:2; 
Jou, 2016:603). Plattner (2016:4) contends that it is citizen’s disappointment with democratic 
governments’ “failure to deliver” that accounts, in large part, for its vulnerability to breakdown. 
Similarly, Jou (2016:603) argues that a low quality of governance, as it pertains to officials 
failing to abide to law, corruption and ineffective bureaucracy, has the greatest influence in 
eroding support for democracy. 
Jou (2016:596) suggests that it is particularly in newly established democracies, such as the 
case of South Africa, that subjective evaluations of the quality of governance have a decisive 
outcome on the durability of the regime. The underlying assumption is that citizens in newly 
established democracies tend to use the quality and performance of the democratic government 
(whether on the basis of political or socio-economic outcomes), as references for granting (or 
withdrawing) support for democracy because they have not yet garnered sufficient experience 
of a democratic regime to evaluate it as an end in itself. Jou (2016:596) contends that this 
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situation arises as newly established democracies, in comparison to their established 
(consolidated) counterparts, have not yet cultivated a political culture where democracy is 
intrinsically valued. This phenomenon in new democracies refers to the “democratic-
authoritarian cleavage” – the supporters of the new regime versus the sceptics (Moreno quoted 
in Jou, 2016:593). Despite democracy allowing for a choice of change in government, citizens 
in newer democracies are seen as not having enough prior experience with the regime to 
evaluate it for what it is, and they therefore use their experience of the performance and quality 
of government as a reference to assess the suitability of the current regime (Jou, 2016:596).  
Consequently, when new democracies encounter periods of economic or political peril, the 
regime becomes threatened by citizen’s dissatisfaction with the performance and quality of 
government and this tends to translate into an unwillingness to support the regime and a 
consideration of other regime types (de Jager & Steenekamp, 2019:1). Diamond (1990:49) 
notes that citizens would not grant their support to democracy unless government performance 
effectively addresses socio-economic issues and achieves social order and justice better than 
an authoritarian regime. Similarly, Jou (2016:596) contends that appeals for democratic 
alternatives “may increase as a function of poor government performance.”  This is because 
the more citizens view governments as being corrupt, non-abiding to law and ineffective in 
driving economic performance, the more likely these citizens become to not only question the 
regime’s legitimacy but also to withdraw support of the regime; potentially granting support to 
non-democratic alternative regime types (Jou, 2016:605). When there is a consideration for 
non-democratic alternatives in the minds of the citizenry then democracy can no longer be 
regarded as ‘the only game in town’.  
It is this consideration of democratic alternatives fuelled by poor performance that presents an 
opportunity for radicalism or extremism to seep into the fabric of a political culture of a 
democratic regime, causing the regime itself to erode. Radicals could be understood as citizens 
who “identify with ideologies of the extreme left or right, and who are thus willing to consider 
other types of regimes besides democracy; they adhere to their beliefs in an uncompromising 
manner, as opposed to the moderates whose view are more flexible” (de Jager & Steenekamp, 
2019:2). When actors hold a radical policy preference, democracy is more likely to 
deconsolidate, as these preferences (whether extreme left or right) are so far removed from the 
preferences of other relevant actors that the consequence is polarisation (Mainwaring and 
Pérez-Liñán, 2012).  
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Radicals are often threatening to the regime in that their political engagement often extends 
beyond the boundaries of democratic participation, including a propensity to resort to violent 
and other non-democratic measures (de Jager & Steenekamp, 2019:2). Mainwaring and Pérez-
Liñán (2012) warn that it is particularly in situations of polarisation or unsatisfactory outcomes 
that radicals tend to seek to safeguard their interest through a subversion of the rule of law and 
a use of violence. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2012) contend that when actors feel that their 
interests are threatened by the continuation of a competitive regime, the costs of tolerating the 
regime increase. The result is that democracies are considered more likely to deconsolidate as 
significant actors become more inclined to mobilise in opposition of the regime, thus speaking 
to the behavioural ramifications, as will be discussed shortly (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 
2012). Foa and Mounk (2017:9) suggest that when citizens no longer commit themselves to 
democracy and no longer support it as the best form of government, while there is 
simultaneously an increasing appeal to anti-system (authoritarian) alternatives, then democracy 
deconsolidates.  
Ultimately, when it comes to the attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation, it could 
be seen that a democratic regime is likely to deconsolidate when actors support the regime 
instrumentally – i.e. valuing the regime for only what it can deliver. In newly established 
democracies, where the assumption is that political attitudes are rooted in instrumental 
appreciation, the implication is citizens evaluate the regime with reference to the performance 
and quality of government in terms of delivering economic (jobs, security, decreased socio-
economic disparities) and political (equality before the law, civil liberties, effective 
bureaucracy, impartial institutions) goods. Accordingly, when democratic governments are 
observed to perform poorly – that is, delivering unfavourable socio-economic and political 
outcomes – then citizens are likely to consider whether non-democratic alternative regime 
types would deliver more favourable outcomes. It is this consideration of non-democratic 
alternatives that allows radicalism, extremism and populism to enter the system – thereby no 
longer rendering democracy as the ‘only game in town’. The result is that democracies are 
potentially on a path to deconsolidation. 
2.3.4 Behavioural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation 
For a democracy to be liberal, behaviourally a political culture must prevail which values and 
fosters “political participation, discussion, and awareness on the part of the citizenry”, 
combined with tolerance of differing political beliefs (Diamond, Lipset and Linz, 1990:9). 
Hence, when it comes to the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation, the general 
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assessment is whether citizens’ behaviour conforms to the rules of the game. In other words, 
the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation requires a consideration of whether 
there is an adherence to a country’s legal framework (Schedler, 2001:70). Behaviourally, a 
democratic regime will endure when there is widespread adherence to the rules of the game, 
namely compliance with the legal framework of the regime (usually constitutionally driven) 
(Diamond, 1997a:14). Conversely, democracies are more prone to deconsolidate when actors 
adopt antidemocratic behaviour – that is, they induce violence in the system (Schedler, 
2001:70; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1997a; Burnell, 2008).  
Before discussing the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation, it should be noted 
that behaviours serve as a manifestation of attitudes. Behaviours do not manifest in a vacuum, 
but rather are understood to be physical expressions rooted in an attitude or disposition. 
Schedler (2001:69) argues that attitudes function as a prime mover of democratic behaviour – 
where behaviour (as influenced by the presiding attitude) serves as a proximate cause of the 
outcome of democratic longevity. There is a causal relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour, where the former serves to influence the latter. A lack of support for democracy 
(attitude) will likely be expressed through an unwillingness to comply with the rules of the 
game, usually leading to democratic deconsolidation.  
According to Schedler (2001:70), the behavioural condition of any democracy refers, broadly, 
to three interrelated components – namely, the transgression of authority, non-acceptance of 
electoral outcomes, and the use of violence within a democratic regime. However, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the framework employed in this study diverts slightly from Schedler 
(2001) in that the transgression of authority component is largely covered under the category 
of the rule of law in the structural condition. Hence, this section will largely focus on the other 
two components: non-acceptance of electoral outcomes and the induction of violence. 
2.3.4.1 Non-acceptance of Electoral Outcomes  
Democracy in its minimalist and most procedural conception is defined as the ability of citizens 
to elect government through free, fair, competitive and regular elections (Schumpter 
1947:269). This definition necessitates that, behaviourally, political actors accept the core tenet 
of the regime, namely free, fair and competitive elections (Schedler, 2001:71). An acceptance 
of the rules of the democratic game means accepting electoral defeat (majority outcomes) and 
hoping for future winnings by democratic means (free and fair elections) (Mainwaring, 
1989:15). Accordingly, elite democratic behaviour in which elites demonstrate their consensus 
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to the regime through an adherence to “peaceful competition for power based on the foundation 
of rule of law [and] tolerance” is fundamental to consolidating a democracy (Diamond, 
1999:69). Schedler (2001:71) contends that when political actors deny competitors access to 
participation in democratic elections, fail to accept electoral defeat, and respond to electoral 
defeat through violent or unconstitutional means, then democracy ceases to be the only game 
in town. Similarly, Huntington (1996:8) contends that regime survival is often threatened by 
elites who win elections, thereby taking power and attempting to cling to it (beyond the 
constitutionally set terms) by undemocratic means (electoral manipulation or force). 
Ultimately, when public officials subvert democratic rules and procedures – particularly in 
relation to the holding of, and the outcomes of, democratic elections – then democracy 
regresses. 
2.3.4.1 Use of Violence 
When it comes to the use of violence, Foa and Mounk (2016:6) contend that democracies are 
safeguarded when political actors strive to obtain their political objectives within the system of 
democracy. Similarly, Diamond (1997a:14) emphasises that the behavioural demonstration of 
loyalty towards a regime occurs differently at elite and mass levels. Political elites (which 
include both incumbent parties and their opposition) must regard democracy as the only viable 
and legitimate framework through which their political interests could be advanced, while at 
the mass level there must be a broad consensus in which citizens commit themselves to 
democratic ideals, and use the democratic process to effect political change regardless of 
whether the system performs well or poorly (Diamond, 1997a:14-15). 
This implies that when actors resort to means outside of the democratic system in pursuit of 
their political goals and begin to subvert the constitutionally prevailing rules, or resort to force 
to effect political change, democracy becomes increasingly destabilised (Schedler, 2001:70). 
Schedler (2001:71) indicates that when actors resort to the “assassination of political 
competitors” and attack “the liberty, physical integrity [or] property of political adversaries 
[and] [use] intimidation [against] voters and candidates [or] [resort] [to] ethnic and social 
cleansing”, then democracies are undoubtedly deconsolidated. Ultimately, the injection of 
violence, whatever the form, into the democratic system is an indication that the regime is 
prone to deconsolidation. 
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2.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has systematically presented the literature on the conditions of democratic 
deconsolidation according to a framework that could be used analytically to determine the 
prospects of a democracy’s survival. Hence, when looking at signs of democratic 
deconsolidation, three conditions are likely: fragile structures (subverted rule of law and poor 
economic performance), negative attitudes and disruptive/violent behaviour. As mentioned, 
each of these conditions could be seen as precipitated by poor governance.  
As shown in table 2.1, poor governance in terms of deconsolidation refers to the lack of 
impartiality – in which authority is exercised in the interests of special relationships and 
personal preferences (functioning with fear, favour or on the basis of partisanship); 
structurally, deconsolidation relates to a subversion of or challenge to the rule of law and 
further to poor socio-economic outcomes; attitudinally, democratic deconsolidation relates to 
actors who no longer deem the democratic regime as the best form of government and begin to 
express their appeal to authoritarian alternatives or anti-system populist politics thereby 
consequently withdrawing their support (Foa & Mounk, 2017:9). This withdrawal of support 
occurs most commonly when actors’ value democracy only instrumentally (Mainwaring & 
Pérez-Liñán, 2012). Furthermore, behaviourally a democracy deconsolidates when actors flout 
the system and use non-democratic means to effect political change.  
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Table 2. 1:  Operationalization of Analytical Framework: Indicators of 
The Conditions of Democratic Deconsolidation 
Conditions  Indicators 
Instigator – Poor 
Governance 
Lack of impartiality - exercising authority in the 
interests of special or personal relationships or interests 
Structural Condition 
1. Institutional 
2. Economic 
 
1. Subversion of or disregard for the rule of law 
2. Sluggish economic growth, increase in poverty, 
inequality and unemployment  
Attitudinal Condition Actors having an instrumental preference for the 
regime; actors tend to evaluate the quality and 
performance of government when deciding on whether 
to support the regime – when the performance and 
quality of government is poor, then there is an openness 
to anti-system, authoritarian/populist politics or regime 
types 
Behavioural 
Condition 
Non-acceptance of electoral outcomes and use of 
violence (actors using non-democratic means to effect 
political change) 
 
As mentioned, the conditions of democratic deconsolidation postulate indicators based on 
robust assumptions that could be applied to various case studies. In this research this framework 
is applied to the case of South Africa – specially focusing on the period during the Zuma 
administration. This is done to determine whether, in terms of each condition and overall, the 
Zuma administration contributed to South Africa’s democracy regressing closer to a state of 
deconsolidation.  
Following this chapter, Chapter 3 offers a contextual foundation for the inception of the Zuma 
administration upon which the analysis of this study is conducted. In addition, Chapter 3 also 
begins the analysis of the case in terms of poor governance as this is considered an instigator 
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to the deconsolidation process. Chapter 4 will continue the analysis through the lenses of the 
consequent conditions of democratic deconsolidation (structural, attitudinal and behavioural).  
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Chapter III – Contextualisation & Analysis of the Zuma Administration 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter established an analytical framework for assessing whether South Africa’s 
democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally as a result of poor 
governance. The conditions for and concomitant indicators adopted for this assessment were 
identified and explained. However, a comprehensive analysis is not possible without 
establishing a sound contextual foundation for it. The aim of this chapter is to provide a 
contextual background against which an analysis of South Africa’s democracy during the Zuma 
years can be achieved. The chapter is divided into two broad parts; the first contextualises the 
inception and tenure of the Zuma administration, and the second attempts to respond to the 
secondary research question by applying the lens of poor governance to the case of South 
Africa during the Zuma administration.  
In laying the contextual groundwork, the first section of this chapter will discuss the accession 
of Jacob Zuma as President of the African National Congress (ANC) in 2007 and of South 
Africa in 2009. Although many perceived Zuma’s rise to power as the ushering in of a new 
dawn – one that marked the end of a government isolated from its support base (both within 
the ANC as well as its wider support base) and signalled the beginning of a pluralist tripartite 
government committed to redressing the appalling conditions of the poor and disenfranchised 
– but much of this proved to be unfounded. On the contrary, the Zuma administration achieved 
little in the way of its initial purported pro-poor endeavours. Instead, the rise of the Zuma 
administration could largely be seen as a response to Mbeki’s centralising of power in the 
Presidency and the factional infighting over the spoils derived from the overarching national 
project – the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) – which had placed a premium on the 
executive power.  
Once in power, the Zuma administration largely focused on strengthening this overarching 
project – as underscored by the Building a National Democratic Society: Strategy and Tactics 
of the ANC4 document – by allowing previously marginalised ANC factions  into the patronage 
                                                 
4 The Building a National Democratic Society: Strategy and Tactics of the ANC document was adopted at the 52nd 
ANC National Conference in 2007. The document derives from the overarching national policy – the National 
Democratic Revolution. The strategies and tactics document outlines the basic approach to strengthening the 
national policy by emphasising a proactive takeover by cadres in all spheres of government and society with the 
view to societal transformation.  
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fold. The national project has since served as the catalyst for the growth of an overextended 
administration governing in the interest of its own partisan ends and eventually culminating in 
the state capture project.5 
Building on this, the chapter will address the secondary research question by focusing primarily 
on the issue of poor governance. In considering whether state institutions govern impartially –
without persuasion or consideration of special/personal relationships – the analysis finds that a 
blurring of state-government-party lines through cadre deployment and the state capture project 
has severely eroded the autonomy of South African institutions to govern and function 
according to their constitutional mandate. This is perhaps most evidently demonstrated in the 
repurposing of the Department of Public Enterprises and its various parastatals, particularly 
South African Airways, Transnet and Eskom, for private ends.  
In analysing poor governance as an instigator to the democratic deconsolidation process in 
South Africa, this chapter maintains that the Zuma administration has largely left behind a 
legacy characterized by a systematic undermining and hallowing out of state institutions which 
has overtly flouted the rule of law and subsequently crushed the spirit and principles of 
constitutional democracy. Consequently, South Africa’s democracy finds itself in a place in 
which it is seen to be vulnerable to democratic deconsolidation. 
3.2 A Contextualization of the Zuma Administration 
3.2.1 The Election and Inception of Zuma’s Government   
In December 2007 former Deputy President Jacob Zuma succeeded former President Mbeki 
by a landslide vote (2 329 to 1 505) for the position of president of South Africa’s dominant 
(ruling) party. By the time of the national elections in 2009, Zuma was set to become South 
Africa’s third democratically elected president. For many that victory  appeared to usher in a 
new dawn marked by a renewed emphasis on the plight of the disenfranchised and the poor, 
accompanied by a revival of the Tripartite Alliance – the ruling ANC, the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).  
However, much of the initial optimism proved to be largely unfounded. The inception of the 
Zuma administration could be seen as a response to the wave of dissatisfaction of those factions 
                                                 
5 According to Swilling (2017), the state capture project could be understood as the establishment of a well-
organised network of companies and individuals who were strategically positioned – by Zuma and members of 
the Gupta family – to neutralise key state institutions in order to divert rents away from state coffers and into 
private hands. 
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(Cosatu and SACP) who were isolated from enjoying the spoils of office derived from the 
overarching national project – the NDR – due to Mbeki’s centralisation of the Presidency. Once 
in power, the Zuma administration largely focused on strengthening the NDR by allowing the 
previously marginalised Cosatu and SACP members’ access to NDR spoils into the fray. 
However, the Zuma administration’s emphasis on the NDR as a cornerstone of its governance 
strategy has not only allowed the growth of a bloated administration, but also created the 
opportunity for state capture. 
The ANC and the NDR as a Backdrop to Zuma’s Rise to Power 
Democratisation in 1994 brought with it the task of transforming South African society from 
an unjust and unequal one to a fairer democratic one. The ANC embarked on this task of 
transformation through its NDR policy – an overarching national project which has served to 
guide the party’s governance approach since winning its first national elections in 1994 (see de 
Jager, 2009; Filatova, 2011; du Toit & de Jager, 2014). The basic tenet of this policy, which is 
rooted in Soviet ideology, is the achievement of a racially demographically representative 
society through a system of cadre deployment in which the ANC assigns some of its members 
to strategic positions within the public service sector (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:98). The term 
‘cadre’ here refers to party members trained and disciplined in the ideology of the party who 
are “expected to exhibit a high level of political commitment and doctrinal discipline” 
(Heywood, 2002:249).  
According to the ANC (2007:4), a “national democratic society is a conscious construct, 
dependent on conscious action by politically advanced sections of society”. This conscious 
construct is primarily to be realised through “strengthening the hold of the democratic 
government on state power, and transforming state machinery to serve the cause of social 
change” (ANC, 1999). As such, the achievement of a national democratic society is seen to 
start with the ANC’s appointment of cadres in various positions of power. The ANC prioritised 
the appointment of cadres to various levels of state, including parliamentary legislators, trade 
union and student movements, and youth, women’s and other mass democratic organisations 
(Turok, 2011:246). This policy has served to justify ANC’s governance strategy of control and 
intervention in all areas of state and the economy.  
The rationale for the NDR was that the best way to mitigate potential sabotage of the new 
government by the opposition would be to install loyal party members who could be trusted 
politically (Hartley, 2011). The ANC explained that ensuring that its policies and elected 
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manifestos would be implemented as intended across all spheres of state required the 
appointment of party loyalists to positions of power (Twala, 2014:161). Booysen (2011:397) 
notes that with the implementation of cadre deployment, the ANC had the opportunity to assign 
specific governance task to so-called trusted deployed members. As such, the NDR also 
allowed the capturing and manipulation of the state’s resources and its structural framework.   
It should also be noted that, while the intended aim of the NDR was to achieve a more equal 
and representative society, it unfortunately allowed for the establishment of a mass patronage 
network in which partisanship was prioritised above competence. Twala (2014:163) notes that 
cadre appointment and deployment are often based on the loyalty and connections that cadres 
have to senior leaders (of regions or provinces) so as to shield these senior members from 
criticism if the need arises. In cases where cadres have ‘proven’ their loyalty, they are rewarded 
with the spoils of office (which include use of state ‘bonuses’, transportation, promotions, to 
name a few). This dynamism of loyalty to those who appoint them has two broad implications: 
firstly, it implies that the cadres govern without accountability to the broad public. Twala 
(2014:163) contends that often the deployed cadres would regard themselves as appointees of 
the ANC rather than public servants, and therefore see themselves as accountable to no one 
other than the alliance deployment committee that appointed them. Quintal (2007:1) therefore 
contends that ANC cadres in positions of massive influence (in the executive, the legislatures 
and state institutions) have created a problem of ‘social distance’ between the cadres and 
ordinary members and supporters. Secondly, the dynamism of cadre loyalty to those who 
appointed them also implies that offers of positions and power become synonymous with 
access to the state and its resources (the so-called rewards of loyalty) (du Toit and de Jager, 
2014:112). When governments can politically control the public bureaucracy and use state 
resources for partisan ends, then the state losses its autonomy, creating a zero-sum game. 
Ultimately, the governance strategy of cadre deployment severely compromised the 
relationship between independent institutions, the elected party and the need for democratic 
representation. In addition, it brings the partisan policy of the NDR into contention with the 
aspirations of impartiality as endorsed in the Constitution. Nonetheless, despite the myriad of 
problems arising from the NDR, this policy served as the overarching governance strategy 
across the various administrations that have governed within the ANC.  
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Coalition of the Aggrieved and the Election of Zuma  
The control of state resources, through the appointment and deployment of loyal cadres, has 
provided a fertile breeding ground for factional infighting. This was, perhaps, most evidently 
displayed in the Mbeki-Zuma succession struggle, which was largely informed by the ANC’s 
reaction to Mbeki, who used “state power to govern over the ANC” (Booysen, 2011:360). In 
other words, the ousting of Mbeki was largely due to his practising of ‘big man politics’, by 
using the power of control (derived from the NDR) to govern over the state and the party for 
purposes of strengthening his position in the Presidency.  
Under Mbeki, the strategy of the NDR reflected a separation between the party and the state 
and a strengthening of the Presidency. This is because the NDR under Mbeki broadly focused 
on the development of state institutions to facilitate improved coordination of state business 
and policy implementation. According to Booysen (2011:369), much of this development 
occurred at the top of the institutional hierarchy, with specific attention given to the Presidency. 
Here, top executive levels of power and bureaucratic executives were given vast 
responsibilities to coordinate and steer government work for the purpose of ensuring effective 
policy implementation (Booysen, 2011:369). As a consequence of the emphasis on state 
institutions, much cadre deployment (and the accompanying spoils of office) became 
centralised at the top levels. For example, Mbeki’s cabinet tended to largely dominate the 
ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) meetings – disregarding the power capacity of 
this organ – effectively creating an inner sanctum which doubled as the NEC’s National 
Working Committee (NWC) that ruled over the ANC (Booysen, 2011:364).  
In addition, Mbeki’s administration was often hostile to the politics of the provinces and used 
national institutions as a vehicle to drive the authority of the Presidency (Butler, 2009:162). 
Southall (2009:323) notes that Mbeki isolated many important individuals within the alliance 
by insisting on appointing premiers and directors from the centre. While this strategy of vesting 
total power within the Presidency succeeded in coordinating government and reigning in the 
wayward tendencies of the provinces, it simultaneously led to the alienation of hungry 
provincial ‘barons’ (Southall, 2015:8). Mbeki’s administration was therefore generally 
perceived as entailing the centralisation of state power under the Presidency, with the party 
itself ‘playing second fiddle’ (Southall, 2015:8). It was this alienation from the central office – 
with its spoils – and the increasing strengthening of the Presidency that led to Mbeki falling 
out of favour. 
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Furthermore, Mbeki’s big man politics also earned him an unenviable reputation of “being out 
of touch with ordinary people” (Mattes, 2002:28). This ‘out of touch’ syndrome was most 
evidently demonstrated in Mbeki’s Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (Aids) denialism, when he chose to stall the roll out 
antiretrovirals because he did not believe that HIV ‘causes’ Aids and therefore should be 
treated accordingly. Mattes (2002:28) observes that: 
in the face of one of the highest HIV infection rates in the world, [Mbeki] [had] 
consistently chosen to fritter away the considerable symbolic authority of his 
office by questioning the causal link between HIV and AIDS, investing time 
and resources in a presidential commission evenly divided between 
mainstream-stream and ‘dissident’ scientists. 
The decisions made by the Mbeki administration on the basis of his HIV/Aids denialism drew 
serious criticism; his policies and choices were seen as having exacerbated the spread of the 
disease. Mbeki’s denialism was also seen reflective of his increasing power over party and state 
governance.  
Beyond these social issues, the economic conditions at the time also contributed to the 
perception of Mbeki’s isolation from ordinary people. This is because the Mbeki 
administration, despite having successfully grown the economy, did not manage to distribute 
its benefits equally. The positive economic growth derived from the technocratic policy of the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution framework as well as the newly created black middle 
class (on the basis of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE)) stood in stark 
contrast with the rising figures of unemployment, crime and poverty (Southall, 2009:325; 
Vincent, 2011:2). As Gumede (2008:262) notes, there was “a disjuncture between the shinning 
mirage of the economic boom in the suburbs and the reality of the rural township areas”. For 
many ANC supporters this was perceived as democracy and its economic benefits serving only 
the interests of the white middle class and the new black middle class.  
Consequently, Mbeki’s leadership style and governance strategy, ultimately culminated in a 
humiliating defeat at the ANC’s National Conference in 2007 in which many factions 
marginalised (particularly Cosatu and SACP members) by Mbeki’s governance style threw 
their weight behind Zuma. Even with the party having lost all confidence in Mbeki, he was 
expected to remain state president for the duration of his tenure, which was to expire in June 
2009 (Southall, 2009:317). However, seemingly in a bid to restore the balance of power back 
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to the party, the NEC (with majority of whom now supported Zuma) decided that Mbeki should 
be recalled. According to Southall (2009:318), the NEC followed the party line that it had 
‘deployed’ Mbeki to the position of the presidency and thus has the right to recall him (although 
constitutionally only Parliament has the authority to end a president’s tenure). Booysen 
(2011:364) contends that “Mbeki’s downfall was that he underestimated the ANC’s 
hierarchical leadership culture and overestimated the reverence for his position at the top of the 
stack”. Ultimately, Mbeki, by mistaking the confidence that the top leadership structure had in 
him as signalling that he could go ahead to institute a supreme leadership style (including 
isolating central members of the party from the spoils of office), caused the downfall of his 
administration himself.  
           3.2.2 Zuma’s Government 
After garnering mass support from a wide range of internal sources – including members from 
the SACP, Cosatu, the ANC Youth League, the ANC Women’s League, BBBEE oligarchs and 
ANC leaders under investigation for corruption (hoping that if Zuma’s case is squashed, theirs 
would be too), and external sources (the ANC’s traditional support base), Zuma became South 
Africa’s third democratically elected president in 2009 (Southall, 2009:323). Once in power, 
the Zuma administration largely concentrated on strengthening the overarching national project 
(NDR), which included dispersing power to those previously marginalised. This was 
particularly underscored by the Building a National Democratic Society: Strategy and Tactics 
of the ANC document adopted at the 2007 conference. This document reemphasised that, for 
the ANC to exercise its vanguard role, the party must prioritise the involvement of all cadres 
in all centres of power (ANC, 2007:12). In addition, it reinforced the importance of the ANC 
retaining a hold on the state by advocating for greater activism in the “mass terrain of civil 
society structures”, particularly those that fell within the intellectual and ideological realms 
(ANC, 2007:12). Ceruti (2008:112) summarises the inception of the Zuma administration as 
simply entailing “old strategies persist[ing] in new conditions”.    
The achievement of the aims set out by the strategy and tactics document brought high levels 
of change among incumbents in public institutions. In relation to the top leadership structure, 
it was imperative for Zuma to substitute Mbeki loyalists with Zuma devotees. This was not 
only to bring security to his position, but also to repay the debt of support given to Zuma in his 
ascension to power. However, as Booysen (2011:362) notes, “this process was moderated by 
the need to win” Mbeki supporters over (this was mainly achieved by assuring Mbeki loyalists 
job or income security). 
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Zuma managed to neatly blend many of the direct interfaces between party and state – with 
power more skewed to the party than to the state. The ANC’s Polokwane NEC was given high-
level representation in the May 2009 cabinet, while eligible members of the NWC were also 
provided with representation in cabinet (Booysen, 2011:366). Other significant changes 
included adding SACP representatives such as Blade Nzimande (Minister of Higher Education 
and Training), Jeremy Cronin (Deputy Minister of Transport), Cosatu representatives in the 
form of Ebrahim Patel (Minister of Economic Development), together with hard nationalists 
such as Jeff Radebe and Nathi Matthews, coupled together with soft nationalists (Tokyo 
Sexwale and Lindiwe Sisulu) as well as eight members of Mbeki’s last cabinet (Calland, 
2009:59-60; Basson & du Toit, 2017:20).  
The cost of Zuma’s political ‘debt repayment’ was an over-bloated government marked by a 
cabinet of 35 ministers (compared to Mbeki’s 2004 cabinet, which had 29 ministers, while 
Mandela’s 1994 cabinet had 25 ministers) (Calland, 2009:56). This inflation was also the result 
of the creation of six new ministries, for example economic development was split into national 
planning and performance monitoring, while education was divided into basic education and 
higher education and training.  
Although these changes were made when Zuma initially took office, eventually allocating 
cabinet positions would become a key instrument in leveraging and wielding political power. 
This is because, unlike his predecessors who were loath to reshuffle their cabinets, unless 
necessary, Zuma reshuffled his cabinet on four separate occasions during his first term as 
president: October 2010 – two ministers were reassigned, seven replaced and 17 new deputy 
ministers appointed; 24 October 2011 – two ministers were removed, two were reassigned, two 
promoted to deputy minister and two were removed; 3 October 2012 – one minister was 
reassigned and one promoted; 9 July 2013 – three ministers removed, three appointed and one 
reassigned (Calland, 2013:60). Calland (2013:60) remarks that “in just three years, the 
character and personnel, as well as the ideological hue and political alchemy of the cabinet had 
changed dramatically, even though the same party was in power”. As de Jager and Steenekamp 
(2019:7) note, the expansion (and regular changes) of Zuma’s cabinet largely reflected the 
elements of partisanship that were a consequence of the NDR.    
In addition to a new cabinet, Zuma brought other changes to government that allowed for a 
broader exercise of power over state institutions. These changes involved the dissolution of 
several bodies such as the Scorpions (an investigative unit which had vigorously investigated 
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Zuma’s involvement in the arms deal6) and the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services, to 
mention just two (Basson & du Toit, 2017:18). They were subsequently replaced by the Hawks 
and a National Planning Commission (which was accompanied by an Economic Development 
Department [EDD]) respectively (Calland 2013:52). These latter bodies were created in part to 
appease the SACP and Cosatu in further assigning power as well as diffusing economic policy, 
planning and power away from Treasury. Initially, the diffusion of power away from Treasury 
was hoped to be achieved by breaking-up the line ministers into smaller ministries which would 
report to a super ministry (Calland, 2013:62). The EDD was to serve as a super ministry that 
would take over the macro-economic policy and strategy process, thereby dispersing economic 
policy-making power more widely across government and away from Treasury (Calland, 
2013:62-3). However, despite these attempts to gain control of economic policy making, the 
EDD ultimately lacked the authority and overarching power to achieve its intended aims. Apart 
from driving the New Growth Path (an economic development framework devised by the Zuma 
administration), the EDD’s role was largely confined to operating as a think tank within 
government (Basson & du Toit, 2017:19). Notwithstanding the various shortcomings of these 
departments, the Zuma administration’s attempts at reconfiguring government, would 
eventually come to reflect one of the first attempts at decentralizing power away from Treasury.  
Beyond these institutional changes, the Zuma administration never fully realized the pro-poor 
agenda and policies that their campaign had so fervently advocated. On the contrary, the myriad 
socio-economic problems such as poverty, high unemployment and crime that had long 
plagued South Africa were increasingly exacerbated. Although Zuma, unlike his predecessor, 
welcomed dissent and created a space for open discussion on these issues (both in the policy 
process and in the public sphere), effective redress by government was ultimately stifled by 
Zuma’s alliance with another partner – the Guptas – as well as his commitment to realizing the 
project of state capture.  
                                                 
6 Zuma was implicated during the trial of his financial advisor at the time, Schabir Shaik, in using his position to 
protect the arms company- Thint Holdings- handling the Strategic Defence Package, a multi-billion-rand military 
acquisition arms deal which aimed at modernizing the South African Defence Force (Basset & Clarke, 2008:789; 
Calland, 2013:3). Within this deal it was alleged that, Thint Holdings paid Zuma via his advisor R500 000 a year 
to prevent investigations of corruption relating to the agreement (Basset & Clarke, 2008:789). 
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3.3 Poor Governance as an Instigator of Democratic Deconsolidation 
3.3.1 State Capture and Governance during the Zuma years 
Figure 3. 1:  Poor Governance as the Instigator of the Democratic Deconsolidation 
Process 
As noted in the previous chapter, an understanding of poor governance broadly requires a 
consideration of the way in which democratic governance is exercised. To put this another way, 
a consideration of governance as an instigator of democratic deconsolidation requires an 
assessment of whether state institutions govern impartially; that is, do they exercise power 
without the persuasion of, or consideration of, special/personal relationships or preferences 
(Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:169). In the absence of impartiality, the state’s autonomy and 
neutrality are eroded. Furthermore, when governments govern in the interests of partisanship, 
then structurally democratic institutions become drained of their democratic content, which 
causes skewed economic outcomes that further erode civic trust (Diamond, 1990:49; Jou, 
2016:601-603). Collectively these conditions could cause democratic regression, if not 
complete breakdown. 
In South Africa good governance centred on impartiality is enshrined in the Constitution and 
acts as an overarching authority for the functioning of all spheres and organs of government. 
The principle of impartiality, and by implication the principle of good governance, is 
specifically stipulated numerous times throughout the Constitution. For example, sections 165 
and 96 prescribe that all arms of government, which include the executive, legislature and the 
judiciary, are required to act impartially (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Moreover, the 
requirement of impartiality as prescribed by the Constitution extends beyond the branches of 
government to include the principles that govern public administration. Sections 195 and 217 
state that services rendered or procured by public enterprises and other organs of state must be 
done impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias (Republic of South Africa, 1996). In 
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addition, public enterprises are required according to section 195 to function efficiently and 
economically, and to use resources effectively by being development oriented (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996). Collectively, these principles and prescriptions set out by the Constitution 
are aimed at achieving good governance. 
Although the Constitution makes provision for good governance and impartiality, the exercise 
of power by the Zuma administration (and the ANC at large) showed strong elements of 
partisanship. This was demonstrated most clearly in the make-up of Zuma’s 2009 cabinet, 
amongst others. Also, while Zuma (unlike Mbeki) ensured that his primary power base 
remained the party rather than the state, he also managed to successfully shift the locus of 
power towards satisfying his own interests (de Jager & Parkin, 2017:14). According to Southall 
(2015:8), Zuma appeased those members who had previously been marginalised by allowing 
ministers who were appointed to those ministries of little personal concern to him to “get on 
with their job”. However, Zuma at the same time “retained strong personal control by 
appointing those loyal to him to ministries which pertained to his political and personal well-
being” (Southall, 2015:8).  This was evident in that “the boards and senior leadership of many 
parastatals (Eskom, South African Airways (SAA), SABC, PetroSA, [to mention a few]) and 
state institutions are often individuals with close ties to those in power” (de Jager & Parkin, 
2017:14). Ultimately the power mechanisms that the NDR allowed served as a catalyst to 
develop the new locus of power – Zuma’s state capture project.  
The project of state capture could be understood as the establishment of a well-organized 
network of companies and individuals that was created strategically to hallow out key state 
institutions in order to divert rents away from state coffers and into private hands (Swilling, 
2017:5). This project largely came to fruition through Zuma’s alliance with the Gupta family.7 
The former Public Protector’s (PP) (2016) report titled State of Capture traces the many events 
which indicated the exertion of influence by the Guptas over Zuma when it came to the 
appointment and removal of cabinet ministers and directors of state-owned enterprises, 
resulting in the improper and potentially corrupt awarding of state contracts.  
                                                 
7 The Guptas (predominantly the brothers Atul, Ajay and Rajesh) are a wealthy Indian-born family who own a 
business empire that spans the computer, technology, mining and media industry- several branches of which have 
been established in South Africa since 1994 (Basson & du Toit, 2017:57). The Guptas and their various companies 
have been closely linked to the Zuma administration via Zuma’s son, Duduzane Zuma, who owns shares in many 
of the Gupta’s businesses.  
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Through the state capture project Zuma and the Guptas were able to capture key state organs 
such as the security cluster, including the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks) and the State Security Agency; and the 
finance agencies, including the South African Revenue Service, Treasury and the Department 
of Public Enterprises (DPE) with its various parastatals. In maintaining the focus on analysing 
governance, only the DPE will be discussed here. Other organs of state, namely the NPA and 
the Hawks, which were central to state capture will be dealt with in Chapter 4 through an 
analysis of the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation as it relates to the rule of law. 
This section will draw on the observations of the PP’s (2016) State of Capture report to 
demonstrate the patterns of patronage and poor governance under the Zuma administration.  
Ultimately, when applying the principle of impartiality and its concomitant prescripts 
enshrined in the Constitution to that of the Zuma administration, it can be seen that good 
governance was hardly achieved. On the contrary, poor governance under Zuma’s 
administration has left behind a dysfunctional organization which has paralyzed state 
institutions, draining them of their capacity to operate equitably, fairly and impartially, and 
effectively hindering their capacity to fulfil their constitutional mandate (Basson & Du Toit, 
2017:77). The legacy of Zuma’s administration and arguably the hallmark of his governance 
has become encapsulated in the political project of state capture.  
3.3.1.1 Capturing DPE and SAA 
In terms of the capturing of DPE and its various parastatals, a clear pattern was unfolding in 
which the wielding of political power through strategic deployment and replacement by Jacob 
Zuma and his cabinet played a central role. Basson and du Toit (2017:96) note that former 
President Zuma “fires a minister, appoints a new minister [who] appoints a new board of 
directors who opens the doors of opportunity for the Gupta/Zuma empire”. In this way, the 
strategies and tactics of the NDR served the aims of state capture. 
A case in point is the capturing of SAA, in which the Guptas nearly overhauled the parastatal’s 
board, undermined its constitutional mandate of operating impartially and cost effectively, and 
caused the government to lose millions in revenue. These events could be traced to October 
2010, when then chair of Parliament’s portfolio committee on public enterprises, Mabel 
Petronella Mentor, requested a meeting with the President to discuss her unhappiness at the 
closure of Pebble Bed Modular Reactor Company (Mentor, 2017:149). As Mentor recounted 
in her interview with former Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, she expected to meet with the 
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President in the Union Buildings, but was instead greeted by Ajay Gupta (Public Protector, 
2016:80; Mentor, 2017:149; Pauw, 2017:302). He then said that the President was unavailable 
and proceeded to escort her to the Gupta compound in Saxonworld where, during their meeting, 
he asked her if she could leverage her position of influence on SAA to stop the airline from 
offering direct flights from Johannesburg to Mumbai (Public Protector, 2016:81; Mentor, 
2017).  
It was further alleged that in return Ajay promised Mentor a promotion to Minister of DPE, 
which was to take effect in the next (and at the time, imminent) cabinet reshuffle (Public 
Protector, 2016; Mentor, 2017). According to Mentor’s recounts, after she rejected the offer by 
Ajay and questioned him about his knowledge on when a reshuffle would take place, Zuma 
entered the room (Mentor, 2017:149). Zuma then proceeded to escort Mentor back to her car 
without addressing what happened or reprimanding Ajay for acting on his official behalf. It 
was further alleged that after receiving this information, Mentor met with SAA’s then chief 
executive officer, Siza Mzimela, to discuss the feasibility of cutting the direct Johannesburg-
Mumbai route, to which Mzimela responded that it would be both unwise and unprofitable 
(Basson & du Toit, 2017:98). 
Nonetheless, by 31 October 2010 former President Zuma, during his first cabinet reshuffle, 
fired then Minister of DPE, Barbara Hogan, and replaced her with a more compromised 
candidate, Malusi Gigaba. Hogan’s departure was not only signalled during Mentor’s meeting, 
but was indicated in June 2010 when she refused to meet with Jet Airways chief executive 
officer who had lobbied SAA for several months for the parastatal to drop its route (Umraw, 
2018; Basson & du Toit, 2017:98). While, at the time, efforts at lobbying for SAA to drop its 
route yield no success, Jet Air established a direct route between Johannesburg and Mumbai, 
which was then SAA’s most lucrative route (Umraw, 2018). In October 2012 SAA board chair 
at the time, Cheryl Carolus, resigned together with seven board members because of a break in 
their relationship with Gigaba (Basson & du Toit, 2017:100). Later, SAA chief executive 
officer and another two general managers stepped down.   
By January 2013 Gigaba found a chairperson replacement in Dudu Myeni, who had long served 
as chair of the Jacob Zuma Foundation (Basson & du Toit, 2017: 98). In April of 2013, 
following several replacements and placement of key individuals, SAA and Jet Air announced 
the roll out of code-sharing agreement that would enable SAA customers to freely use Jet Air 
between Johannesburg and Mumbai, Delhi and Bangladesh (Umraw, 2018). However, this 
expansion supposedly driven by SAA was seemingly unsustainable, as by early 2015 the 
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parastatal announced that due to financial losses, it would remove the Mumbai-Johannesburg 
route (Basson & du Toit, 2017:99). In essence, the  route, which in 2010 had been one of SAA’s 
most profitable, had in five years become too costly to maintain.  
As Basson and du Toit (2017:101) remark, “whether financial loss is the reason behind the 
closure of SAA’s Johannesburg to Mumbai route or not, the fact remains that less than five 
years after Ajay offered Mentor a ministerial post in exchange for dropping the route, his 
wishes came true”. More disconcerting is that the PP’s (2016) report found that there were no 
measures taken by anyone in relation to the investigation of Mentor’s allegations against Zuma. 
The PP (2016:345) concluded that if Zuma were guilty of allowing the Guptas to influence the 
appointment of ministers, then he would have contravened section 2.3(e) of the Executive 
Ethics Code (“which prohibits a member of the Executive from using information received in 
confidence in the course of their duties otherwise than in connection with the discharge of their 
duties”). Nonetheless, the events that unfolded at SAA indicate the way in which former 
president Zuma used his position and influence in making cabinet appointments to strategically 
place a person in the DPE to ensure the capturing of SAA. 
3.3.1.2 Capturing Transnet  
The pattern of deployment and replacement in the interest of benefiting personal and special 
relationships was repeated in one of Transnet’s largest tender deals for the purchasing of 1 064 
locomotives. As announced during Zuma’s February 2012 State of the Nation Address, South 
Africa would embark on a massive infrastructure development drive (Republic of South Africa, 
2012). This entailed, in part, addressing Transnet’s market demand strategy, which required a 
R300 billion investment over seven years for capital infrastructure projects – the bulk of which 
would be dedicated to rail projects (Republic of South Africa, 2012).  
However, prior to the announcement, several individuals were assigned to key positions to set 
the capture strategy in motion. This included Zuma’s appointment of Gigaba as Minister of 
DPE in 2010, Gigaba’s appointment of Iqbal Sharma to the position of Chair of Transnet’s 
board of acquisitions and disposals committee, which was responsible for overseeing the 
awarding of large tenders (Sharma was a known Gupta associate, who had a stake in Gupta-
owned steel manufacturing business VR-Laser); and the appointment of Anoj Singh in July 
2012 as Transnet’s chief financial officer (Basson & du Toit, 2017:105).  
Following the infrastructure development announcement and several cadre appointments later, 
in July 2012 Transnet, as part of the development drive, advertised a tender worth R50 billion 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 53 
 
for the acquisition of 599 electric and 465 diesel locomotives (Basson & du Toit, 2017:105). 
By March 2014 this tender was awarded to four different companies, which included a split 
between China South Rail (359) and Bombardier Transportation (240) for the supply of electric 
locomotives, as well as a split between China North Rail Rolling Stock (232) and General 
Electric Transportation (233) for the supply of diesel locomotives (Swillling, 2017). Three 
months later the Mail and Guardian published an article that implicated Iqbal Sharma (then 
chairperson of Transnet’s board tender committee) in the locomotive deal and revealed 
Duduzane Zuma and Rajesh Gupta as key beneficiaries. According to the article, Sharma 
entered into negotiations to buy Zuma/Gupta-owned engineering firm VR Laser (Faull, 
Bhardwaj, Letsaolo, Sole and Brummer, 2014).  While these negotiations were still ongoing, 
the four successful bidders all visited VR Lasers premises to “assess the profitability of 
subcontracting work to VR Laser” (Faull, Bhardwaj, Letsaolo, Sole and Brummer, 2014).  
Essentially, what had happened was that the person responsible for awarding the locomotives 
tender had used his position to profit personally from the deal through subcontracting. 
Additionally, the son of the President at the time as well as Rajesh Gupta also stood to gain.  
When the article was published, these events were purely speculation; however, in 2017 a series 
of leaked emails, known as the Guptaleaks (which eventually revealed the extent of state 
capture) dispelled any notion that these events were speculative. According to the Guptaleaks, 
in December 2012, following Transnet’s advertisement of the locomotive tender, the parastatal, 
under the stewardship of then chief executive officer Brian Molefe, appointed an advisory firm, 
McKinsey and its partners Regiments to oversee the financial transaction of the tender at a 
capped amount of R375 million (amaBhungane & Scorpio, 2017; Swilling, 2017; Public 
Protector, 2016:56). McKinsey and Regiments, as transaction advisors, then subcontracted 
large portions of its contract to Trillian Capital Partners (amaBhungane & Scorpio, 2017; 
Public Protector, 2016:56/7).  In 2014 the Guptas made an offer to purchase Regiments, but 
this was rejected (Faull, Bhardwaj, Letsaolo, Sole and Brummer, 2014).  
Subsequently, Eric Wood, a 32-percent shareholder in Regiments, led the company to form 
Trillian Capital with Salim Essa (a Gupta business associate) (Public Protector, 2016:56/7). 
According to Fundudzi Forensic investigations, it was found that McKinsey was given 
preferential treatment as its proposal was received after the application closing date of 10 June 
2014 (Gous, 2018). Furthermore, investigative reports revealed that Singh (then chief financial 
officer of Transnet) told Molefe that Regiments advised the spilt of the locomotive deal 
between four service providers (Basson & du Toit, 2017:105). Ultimately, through a network 
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of key individuals and companies, the tender deal was assigned in such a way that the Guptas 
and several associates profited handsomely at the cost of the state’s infrastructural 
development. Consequently, the rigging of the tender process and the subversion of the 
constitutional rule of impartiality in awarding state contracts not only resulted in inefficient 
service delivery (when the first batch of locomotives arrived they were plagued by technical 
problems), but also huge financial losses for the state (this will be dealt with in Chapter 4 
through the economic performance lens of the structural condition of democratic 
deconsolidation).  
3.3.1.3 Capturing Eskom 
Although the incidents with SAA and Transnet pointed to instances of strategic capturing and 
profiteering from state parastatals by Zuma and Gupta-owned companies and associates, none 
would be as blatant as the events that unfolded at Eskom, which resulted in several years of 
periodic load shedding, retrenchments as cost-cutting measures, and high tariff increases that 
inflated consumer costs and raised the overall cost of living in South Africa. In the case of 
Eskom, through strategic manoeuvring and leveraging political power, the Guptas were able to 
usurp an entire coal mine.   
The attempts by the Guptas to gain control of Optimum (a mining company that supplied coal 
to Eskom through its Mpumalanga-based Brakfontein mine) started as early as 1993. It was in 
this year that Optimum, through its parent company Glencore, signed a contract with Eskom 
to supply its Hendrina power station with 5.5 million tons of coal over the next 15 years (Basson 
& du Toit, 2017:112). Although the deal was successfully processed, by 2013 Optimum 
triggered the hardship clause in its 1993 agreement, as the company had been operating at a 
financial loss (Capazorio, 2017). Subsequently, Eskom and Optimum entered into negotiations 
to establish an agreement that would keep the company afloat and allow it to continue to supply 
coal until December 2018 – the legal end of the 1993 contract (Capazorio, 2017).  
However, during this negotiation period several significant shifts occurred. In December 2014 
cabinet almost completely overhauled the Eskom board and nine new directors (5 of whom 
were directly linked to Salim Essa8) were appointed (Sole, McKune & Brummer, 2016). In 
addition, nine of Eskom’s 13 directors were linked to the Guptas through family, friends or 
business connections. Furthermore, by mid-2015 Lynn Brown (who had replaced Malusi 
                                                 
8 Salim Essa is a well-known associate businessman to the Gupta family. Essa owns several shares in Gupta-
owned enterprises including VR Laser and Trillian Holdings, to mention a few. 
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Gigaba as Minister of Public Enterprises) appointed Brian Molefe as chief executive officer of 
Eskom (Public Protector, 2016:118). Eventually, the Eskom board appointed in 2014 would be 
predominantly made up of individuals with direct or indirect business or personal relationships 
with Zuma’s son and the Gupta family (Public Protector, 2016:119). As such, the Eskom board 
was considered to have been improperly constituted (Public Protector, 2016:347). 
Nonetheless,  by consequence of several structural shifts and the appointment of Molefe, the 
negotiated deal to assist Optimum in continuing operations was negated. In response, Optimum 
proposed a counteroffer to Eskom in which the parastatal would receive R300 per ton of the 
coal supplied by Optimum until December 2018. The PP (2016:23) report notes that at this 
point four significant things happened.  
1) Eskom rejected the offer proposed by Optimum and imposed a R2.1 billion 
extraordinary fine for supplying substandard coal since 2012. (According to the PP 
(2016:23) report, Eskom refusing to sign the new deal of coal supply from its Hendrina 
Power Station meant that the parent company Glencore suffered from severe prejudice). 
2) Optimum retrenches 380 workers to ease financial constraints. 
3) KPMG, an audit firm, approaches Optimum with an anonymous offer to purchase the 
company for R2 billion.  
4) By 31 July 2015, unable to cope with the financial strain, Optimum placed itself under 
business rescue. 
Following these events, and just two years after he was fired from the position of mining 
minister by Zuma, Ngoako Ramatlhodi reportedly told amaBhugane that he was fired because 
he would not concede to pressure by Molefe to blackmail Optimum into selling by suspending 
its mining license pending the payment of the R2 billion fine (Swilling, 2017). According to 
Ramatlhodi, he refused to further exacerbate the load-shedding crisis which was already 
underway in South Africa (Swilling, 2017). Consequently, Ramatlhodi was perceived as a 
hinderance to the Gupta deal and was subsequently removed from his ministerial position.  
The search for a new mining minister was easily settled in August of 2015, when a property 
consultant from the Free State emailed the curriculum vitae of a local teacher, Joseph Zwane, 
to Tony Gupta (Basson & du Toit, 2017:113). Zwane’s curriculum vitae indicated that apart 
from teaching, he served as a Member of the Executive Council under Free State premier Ace 
Magashule (a long-time associate and benefactor of the Gupta’s). As Basson and du Toit 
(2017:113) note, in hindsight, it is safe to conclude that Zwane was introduced to the Gupta’s 
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by Magashule. By 2 September 2015 ANC Secretary General, Jesse Duarte, sent a letter to 
Parliament informing them that Zwane had been nominated to fill the vacancy of ANC Minister 
of Parliament (as the Gupta leaks would later show, this letter was forwarded to Tony Gupta 
on the same day) (Sole & Comrie, 2017). Only three weeks after Ramatlhodi was fired, Zwane 
was hired as new mining minister. With the appointment of Zwane, Tegeta9 could easily take 
over Optimum (which remained under business rescue).  
During this time Eskom’s executive group had been pressurising Optimum to find a more 
permanent solution to its financial hardship and weakened coal supply (Capazorio, 2017). By 
29 November 2015 Zwane met with the chief executive officer of Glencore (Optimum’s parent 
company), together with Tony Gupta and Salim Essa (Capazorio, 2017). According to 
investigative reports, Zwane admitted that this meeting was held to persuade Glencore’s CEO 
to sell his shares to the Guptas (Basson & du Toit, 2017:117). Allegedly, the meeting ended 
with a deal settlement in which the CEO sold his shares to Tony Gupta (Basson & du Toit, 
2017:117).  
On 11 December 2015 it was announced that Tegeta had purchased two Optimum coal mines 
and an export allocation at Richards Bay coal terminal for R2.15 billion (Public Protector, 
2016:184). Essentially, Zwane as mining minister had used his position of power to ensure that 
Gupta-owned Tegeta could take advantage of Optimum’s dire financial status and successfully 
ensure a purchase transaction. Zwane’s support for the deal implied that Tegeta had an unfair 
advantage over other interested potential buyers. Here the PP (2016) report concluded that it is 
unlawful for ministers to use their official position of authority to unfairly and unduly influence 
a contract for a friend. Zwane’s bias in favouring Tegeta implied that he had contravened the 
principle of impartiality (as prescribed in sections 195 and 217 by the Constitution) when it 
comes to the contracting of goods and services carried out fairly, impartially and without bias 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996; Public Protector, 2016).  
More worrying than the partisanship displayed in the procurement of Optimum and the supply 
of coal to Eskom are the various gaps in the procurement procedures that Eskom had followed. 
The Denton (2015) report – which investigated the status of the business and the challenges 
experienced by Eskom – showed that while there was a battery of policies and legislation on 
the procurement process of vendors to Eskom, contraventions in the implementation of these 
                                                 
9 Tegeta Exploration and Resources Pty Ltd was a Gupta-owned company that mines and produces precious 
metals. 
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policies, particularly as they pertain to the procurement process, continued. It was found that 
often “emerging miners do not comply with all coal supplier requirements, and that the decision 
to appoint a coal supplier vests in a single person who finally decides which supplier will 
receive a CSA [Coal Supply Agreement] and which supplier will be excluded” (Denton, 2015). 
In addition, it was also shown that often successful suppliers (who tend to lack specific 
requirements) are accommodated to bring them into compliance with policy requirements for 
suitable coal (other) vendors (Denton, 2015). Ultimately, these loopholes – which are only two 
amongst many – has allowed for nepotism and corruption to stifle effective functioning and 
power-generation capabilities of Eskom. Moreover, these gaps in the checks and balances have 
sparked major economic costs for the state, which will be further elaborated on in Chapter 4 
under the economic component of the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation. 
Considering the various kinds and levels of manipulation and manoeuvring that were 
experienced in each of the parastatals – SAA, Transnet and Eskom – it could be seen that the 
Zuma administration displayed signs of grossly poor governance. Appointing loyalists to key 
positions not only hindered service delivery, but also indicated that these institutions 
contravened the provisions of impartiality prescribed by the Constitution by acting to serve 
Zuma/Gupta self-interest (Public Protector, 2016:348). More concerning is that, despite the 
blatant ways in which Zuma, the Guptas and various other associates improperly benefited 
from state resources, there had been limited recourse to the law during the perpetration of these 
improper (and often illegal) acts (Public Protector, 2016:348). As such, when it comes to 
governance, it could be seen that South Africa’s democracy has suffered tremendously through 
draining state institutions of their democratic development and violating the principle of 
impartiality.  
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
In analysing the governance of the Zuma administration against the backdrop of the condition 
of governance of democratic deconsolidation, together with the prescriptions set out in the 
Constitution, this chapter has shown that the administration has largely left behind a legacy 
characterized by a systematic undermining and hollowing out of state institutions, dismissing 
the rule of law and crushing the spirit and principles of constitutional democracy. This was 
largely achieved through the political project of state capture in which Zuma and his personal 
allies – the Guptas – established a well-organized network of companies and individuals who 
were strategically positioned to neutralize key state institutions to divert rents away from state 
coffers and into private hands (Swilling, 2017).  
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These patterns were clearly demonstrated in the capture of SAA, whereby Zuma had 
strategically reshuffled cabinet in 2010 by appointing a new DPE minister who could use his 
position of power to negotiate and influence business operations in favour of Ajay Gupta’s 
eagerness to have the airline drop its most lucrative route. This was again seen when Gigaba 
appointed Molefe together with several other individuals to key positions to ensure that the 
Guptas would profit from South Africa’s major infrastructure development drive undertaken 
by Transnet. Here, through a network of key individuals and companies, the locomotive tender 
deal was assigned in such a way that the Guptas and several associates profited handsomely at 
the expense of state infrastructural development.  
Consequently, the rigging of the tender process and the subversion of the constitutional rule of 
impartiality in awarding state contracts resulted in inefficient service delivery, which further 
eroded public trust in government promises and agendas. However, none of these schemes was 
more pervasive and destructive than the Gupta’s usurping of Optimum and gaining control of 
Eskom, which resulted in periodic load-shedding since 2008 and severely stifled economic 
growth and significantly aggravated conditions of poverty. The poor governance of the Zuma 
administration has resulted in dysfunctional government that has paralyzed state institutions, 
draining them of their capacity to operate equitably, fairly and impartially, and effectively 
succeeding in hindering their capacity to fulfil their constitutional mandate.  
Building on this analysis, Chapter 4 will turn to an account of South Africa’s democracy during 
the Zuma years using the three lenses of the analytical framework of democratic 
deconsolidation: structural, attitudinal and behavioural. The structural condition will be 
examined in two sections, the first of which focuses on the institutions responsible for 
upholding the rule of law and the subversion of these institutions by the Zuma administration, 
while the second section focuses on economic regress and the socio-economic conditions that 
were exacerbated under Zuma’s governance. The attitudinal condition will consider the effects 
of Zuma’s governance on attitudes (support) for democratic governance. Finally, Chapter 4 
will discuss the rise in anti-democratic behaviour in South Africa, which has largely been a 
response to the Zuma administration’s disregard of the myriad of demands by the public for 
improved service delivery.  
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Chapter IV – Analysis of Democratic Regress during the Zuma Years 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided an analytical framework that lay out the conditions of democratic 
deconsolidation – weak structural elements (subversion of the rule of law and economic 
malaise), and negative attitudes and destructive behaviours – as caused by poor governance. 
Chapter 3 established the contextual foundation for an analysis of South Africa’s democratic 
regress during the Zuma years. In building on this foundation, Chapter 3 proceeded to answer 
the secondary research question guiding the analysis – was poor governance an instigator in 
facilitating the process of democratic deconsolidation in South Africa during the Zuma years? 
- by applying the first component – poor governance – of the analytical framework. By applying 
the lens of poor governance, it was shown that the principle of impartiality in governing 
institutions, particularly state-owned enterprises, was either damagingly compromised or 
seriously eroded.  
This chapter will continue addressing the primary research question by proceeding with the 
analysis through applying the structural (rule of law and economic) condition, attitudinal 
condition and the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation to the case of South 
Africa during the Zuma administration. As such, this chapter will specially be geared towards 
offering a response to the primary component of the research question, that is: did South 
Africa’s democracy deconsolidate structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma 
years?   
In focusing on the primary question, this chapter shows that the predatory patterns established 
within various government networks and state parastatals could not have been achieved without 
undermining the rule of law. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of Nkandla, which 
not only reflected the ruling party’s willingness to condone and conceal poor governance, but 
also tested the independence of the Constitution and its accompanying watch dogs – 
particularly that of the Public Protector (PP). The economic cost of the patterns of patronage 
woven into the African National Congress (ANC) under Zuma has been severe – with poverty, 
inequality and unemployment rates rocketing. These dire economic circumstances contrast 
sharply with the initial expectation of economic emancipation that the birth of democracy 
brought. In a context where many South Africans value democracy instrumentally, this 
mismatch between expectation and reality has consequently not only led to a citizenry whose 
support for democracy is waning, but whose appeal to non-democratic alternatives is 
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increasing. Ultimately an unresponsive government marred by state capture and cadre 
deployment amid rising discontent amongst its citizenry opened the way for corrupt 
demagogues and populist sentiments to seep into the fabric of South African society and be 
increasingly absorbed; this discontent is most evident in the recent upsurge in violent often 
militant public protest action. Collectively these trends in structures, attitudes and behaviours 
could be seen to place South Africa’s regime closer to democratic deconsolidation. 
This chapter will be divided into three broad sections; the first focuses on the structural 
condition of democratic deconsolidation, while the second and third sections focuses on the 
attitudinal and behavioural conditions respectively. Under the structural condition, the chapter 
will deal with the subversion of the rule of law (particularly drawing on the case of Nkandla) 
and the unravelling of the security sector (with reference to the Hawks and National 
Prosecuting Authority) as well as the economic costs of poor governance – increasing rates of 
poverty, inequality and unemployment. The chapter will then examine the subsequent two 
conditions: the attitudinal and behavioural conditions of democratic deconsolidation by 
highlighting the way that the expectation of economic emancipation and the reality of poor 
economic performance amid poor governance have eroded South Africans’ support for 
democracy – drawing them increasingly to non-democratic alternatives and providing fertile 
ground for violent protest and populists parties to be increasingly absorbed into the South 
African political landscape. 
4.2 Structural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation 
 
Figure 4. 1: Structural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation broadly 
concerns itself with the structures that underpin a democratic regime. This relates to both 
institutions and the economy. In relation to institutions, democratic deconsolidation largely 
requires an assessment of the establishment of the rule of law, institutional capacity and 
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accountability. This is because these structures set out the rules for the effective functioning of 
the democratic process.  
The economic aspect of democratic deconsolidation requires an audit of the economic 
development and performance of the economy within the regime. This is because without 
material improvement the demos, particularly in newly established democracies like South 
Africa, may become inclined to forgo political empowerment for economic freedom.  
4.2.1 Rule of Law in South Africa – Accountability Subverted  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the patterns of patronage within state parastatals and government 
bureaucracy at large could not have been achieved without compromising on the principles of 
good governance enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore, an assessment of democratic regress 
in South Africa requires consideration of whether the rule of law was broadly respected, 
institutions were independent and robust, and political officials held to account. As set out in 
the analytical framework in Chapter 2, the rule of law serves as a fundamental framework not 
only for setting out the rules of the game, but also for shaping engagement between political 
actors. The rule of law encompasses independent and impartial governing institutions 
(judiciary) that can provide the checks and balances necessary for ensuring that the rules of the 
game are obeyed (accountability). Typically, these rules and their associated institutions are 
exemplified through a constitution which reigns supreme and ensures transparency and 
accountability (Mottair, 2002). In the absence of a stringent rule of law and an independent 
judiciary, the rights, dignity and equality of citizens are not only at risk, but the rules of the 
democratic game become vulnerable to the manipulation of powerful political actors 
(O’Donnell, 2005:3).   
However, the rule of law does not function on its own, but rather requires “an exchange of 
responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens” (Schmitter, 2004:47). In 
other words, the participation of elites in terms of holding one another accountable and being 
accountable to relevant institutions that ensure checks in the system is necessary for the 
realization of a robust democracy premised on the rule of law.  Two types of accountability are 
essential for a well-functioning democracy: vertical accountability (the responsibility that 
elected leaders acquire for their political decisions affecting citizen-electors) and horizontal 
accountability (the obligation of government to account to institutional actors that ensure 
checks and balance). When state institutions and elected representatives are unwilling to 
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scrutinize one another and be scrutinized, then democratic regimes are vulnerable to democratic 
deconsolidation. 
The Zuma Years: Accountability Subverted 
These conditions of democratic deconsolidation, particularly as they pertain to vertical and 
horizontal accountability and the unwillingness of elected leaders to account to institutional 
actors, were frequently manifested during the Zuma administration. Events such as the arms 
deal (mentioned in Chapter 3) and the landing of a Gupta-charted private jet at Waterkloof 
Airforce Base – one of South Africa’s National Key Points – in 2013, not only speak to the 
tendency towards poor governance, but also demonstrate a willingness to disregard 
constitutional obligations in terms of the protection of state resources, offices and functionaries. 
Graham (2013) observes that the Zuma era saw a shift towards a blatant disrespect for 
constitutional values and their watchdog institutions. 
This disrespect was not only been demonstrated by Zuma and the elites within his network, but 
increasingly reflected a broader antagonism of the ANC towards the Constitution. Du Toit and 
de Jager (2014:108) explain this antagonism as relating to a perception of entitlement by the 
ruling party whereby it believes it should have “more power to do as it sees fit, with fewer 
checks and balances, and that the Constitution is a hinderance to this aim” (du Toit & de Jager, 
2014:108). These disquieting attitudes reflect a growing disregard for constitutionally binding 
decisions and institutions, and a growing preference for the authority of party power (du Toit 
& de Jager, 2014:108). Considering the antagonistic attitudes of the ANC towards the 
Constitution and a growing tendency to disregard the rule of law, there is not much reassurance 
that South Africa is heading in the right direction. On the contrary, when it came to the rule of 
law, the Zuma administration showed its willingness to thoroughly test the boundaries of South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
Perhaps, the most pervasive example of this test was the matter of the security upgrades to 
Nkandla (the private homestead of Jacob Zuma), where Zuma was accused of using state funds 
amounting to R203 million from the Department of Public Works (DPW) to modify and 
upgrade his private home. The Nkandla saga prompted several investigations and led the way 
to a campaign by several members of the ANC of attacks on the office of the PP. This not only 
demonstrated a disdain for constitutional mechanisms of checks and balances (as evidenced by 
the growing militancy in Parliament), but also provided the opportunity for the rise of populist 
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sentiments by opposition candidates to claim victory by insisting that Zuma ‘pay back the 
money’.  
The Nkandla saga came to the fore through an investigation undertaken by a journalist, Mandy 
Rossouw, who was initially interested in how Nkandla changed once a local resident became 
president (Gqubule, 2017:89). Whilst visiting the area for research, Rossouw discovered that 
massive upgrades were being done to Zuma’s private homestead and that these upgrades 
coincided with other works done in the area by the DPW (Gqubule, 2017:89). These upgrades 
became the new focus of Rossouw’s article which, when published on 4 December 2009, 
revealed that the then President was expanding his home to include security features – which 
included a cattle kraal, fire pool, amphitheatre and visitors centre, amongst others – to the cost 
of R65 million and the tax payer is “footing the largest chunk of the bill” (Rossouw, 2009). But 
prior to the publication of this article the Presidency issued a statement saying that the 
information included in the investigation undertaken by Rossouw was misinterpreted – the 
upgrades to Zuma’s private home were funded exclusively with private money of the Zuma 
family and that the DPW was not involved in this construction work (The Presidency, 2009).  
While these events were merely speculation at the time, in 2012 a letter leaked by a whistle-
blower to the City Press revealed communication between Kenneth Khanyile (then Manager 
of DPW) and Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde (then Minister of DPW) indicating that the cost of 
“prestige project A” between the state and principal amounted to R203 million (R200m splurge 
on Zuma homestead, 2012). This article, as well as several others, led to a public outcry and 
mounting political pressure from opposition parties. On 15 November 2012 Zuma addressed 
Parliament on the topic – he assured members that the upgrades were privately funded and that 
the homestead had a bond for which he continues to pay (Gqubule, 2017:92). Zuma went on to 
explain that the only part of his residence for which the DPW was liable were the security 
features (Gqubule, 2017:92). But this statement by Zuma was undermined on 17 November 
2012, when City Press reported that no bond was registered by Zuma for the Nkandla property 
(Gqubule, 2017:92). By 20 November the Presidency again attempted to quell the mounting 
pressure by validating the claim that there was an existing bond owned by Zuma and that proof 
of this would be provided, but only to an authorised agency or institution empowered by the 
Constitution (Hansard, 2012). 
This culture of secrecy and non-accountability within the ANC government came to a head on 
12 February 2015, when the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) disrupted the parliamentary 
procedure during the State of The Nation Address and demanded en bloc that Zuma “pay back 
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the money”. In response, Baleka Mbete (speaker of the National Assembly) authorised the 
arrival of the police in the chamber to remove the disruptive EFF members (Calland & Pienaar, 
2016:65). By making Parliament more militant the ANC not only demonstrated the extent of 
its willingness to conceal poor governance and promote undemocratic behaviour, but also to 
compromise the constitutional rules of the game.  
However, this willingness in turn provided opposition groups and other members of civil 
society with fertile ground to rally together and opened the way for a mass social activist 
campaign demanding accountability to chants of “pay back the money”. Additionally, it also 
provided opposition parties with the opportunity to promote populist sentiments into the minds 
of an already receptive population, thus speaking to its attitudinal ramifications as will be 
discussed shortly.  
Other individuals, such as Professor Pierre de Vos, exercised their constitutional rights by 
asking the PP to “probe whether Zuma had breached the executive ethics code by lying to 
Parliament” (Gqubule, 2017:93). This request was followed by a similar one from the 
Democratic Alliance, who were amongst the first political parties to join the fray. Accordingly, 
the PP, in keeping with the constitutional mandate of the office, undertook an investigation into 
Nkandla. On 19 March 2014 the PP released her report titled “Secure in Comfort” in which 
the main findings of the report concluded that:    
• The Zuma family unduly benefitted from the security upgrades and was therefore liable 
to repay the taxpayers’ money; 
• The implementation of the security measures implemented at Zuma’s homestead failed 
to comply with the parameters of the National Key Points Act of 201010 and the Cabinet 
Policy of 200311; 
• “The organs of state involved in the Nkandla Project failed dismally to follow Supply 
Chain Management prescripts” in respect of the procurement of goods and services for 
the Nkandla project – this failure constituted improper conduct and maladministration; 
• Zuma contravened the Executive Ethics Code12 and the Constitution by not taking 
reasonable steps to prevent irregular spending of state funds for personal gain; 
                                                 
10 The National Key Points Act of 2010 provides for the protection of sites of national strategic importance against 
sabotage as determined by the Minister of Police. 
11 Cabinet Policy of 2003 is a policy instrument that regulates security installations at state properties. 
12 Executive Ethics Code provides ethical guidelines governing the conduct of members of the Cabinet, Deputy 
Ministers and members of provisional Executive Councils. 
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• No tender process was followed in procuring an architect and therefore the usage of 
Zuma’s private architect for work done by the DPW pointed to the possibility of cross-
subsidisation; 
• The upgrades, which included a fire pool, amphitheatre, visitors centre and cattle kraal, 
did not constitute security upgrades; 
• The whole project failed to comply with procurement procedures and legislation, 
therefore runaway costs could be incurred leading to large-scale looting (Public 
Protector, 2016). 
However, prior to its release, several attempts to prevent the publication of the PP’ report were 
made by members of ANC. Thulas Nxesi (then Minister of DPW), Jeff Radebe, Nkesinami 
Nhleko, Mathole Motshekga and Siyabinga Cwele were instrumental in instigating what can 
be regarded as a concerted campaign of intimidation against the PP. Nxesi, Cwele and 
Mthethwa established an inter-ministerial task team (made up of employees from the DPW and 
state security) to investigate the Nkandla matter (this was done during the same time as the 
investigations by the PP) (Department of Public Works, 2013). The focus of this report was on 
detailing the scope and procurement of the upgrades. On 27 January 2013 Nxesi revealed the 
main findings of the investigation – that Zuma was not guilty of abusing state funds for private 
gain and that the core of the Nkandla debacle lay in the lack of due diligence by members 
involved in the process of awarding contractors’ contracts (Department of Public Works, 
2013). Furthermore, their investigation did not include mention of the letter by Khanyile to the 
Minister regarding the costs of ‘prestige project A’. Ultimately, the findings of the reports of 
the internal task team constituted an extreme anthesis of the findings of the report by the PP. 
Further seeking to undermine the PP, and to conceal poor governance in the Nkandla matter, 
Nxesi, Mthethwa and Cwele, amongst others, applied to the North Gauteng High Court for an 
interdict to stop the PP from releasing her report (Gqirana, 2016). This was done on the basis 
that the report by the PP would compromise the security of the president and that the DPW 
needed more time to respond to the PP’s findings (Gqirana, 2016). In response, the PP filed an 
opposing affidavit in which she detailed how the ANC ministers were non-compliant in her 
investigations and had pressured her to drop the investigation (Basson & du Toit, 2017:46). 
The ministers subsequently withdrew the application before the application could be heard in 
court.  
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However, the debacle did not end there. By late 2013 Zuma signed a proclamation for the 
Special Investigative Unit (SIU) – despite it being secondary in authority to the PP – to 
investigate irregular expenditure and unlawful conduct by civil servants and companies 
involved in Nkandla (Republic of South Africa, 2013). The need for the proclamation was 
based on what Zuma considered an extreme anomaly between the findings of the reports by 
the DPW and the PP (Basson & du Toit, 2017:49).  In taking this position, Zuma ultimately 
gave equal weight to all three reports – disregarding the constitutional independence and 
authority of the PP as a Chapter 9 institution.13 Nonetheless, the SIU report focused on the 
misdemeanours of public officials and contractors. The report by the SIU, despite agreeing that 
the Zuma family benefited from the upgrades, made no adverse findings against the then  
president (Republic of South Africa, 2013). The SIU report also did not raise the possibility of 
cross-subsidisation, but instead blamed the perceived looting on the wastage of funds by the 
architect. 
By August 2015, in considering the three reports, the Parliamentary Committee established to 
address the Nkandla matter adopted Nxesi’s report and effectively declared the Nkandla matter 
closed. However, after several attacks and attempted subversion and undermining of the 
constitutionally vested authority of the PP, the Nkandla matter culminated in a hearing by the 
Constitutional Court (initiated by opposition parties). On 31 March 2016 Chief Justice 
Mogoeng Mogoeng ruled that: 
• Zuma neither paid for the non-security features nor reprimanded the relevant Ministers 
and functionaries in their implementation of the upgrades; 
• Zuma failed to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the 
land by disregarding the report and subsequent remedial action suggested by the PP in 
terms of her constitutional powers. In addition, Zuma was found to have been in breach 
of his constitutional obligation to comply, assist and protect the PP to ensure her 
independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness;  
• The power of the PP to suggest remedial action has legal effect and is binding; therefore, 
neither the executive nor the National Assembly is entitled to respond to this suggestion 
unless the remedial action has been set aside through proper judicial process.  
                                                 
13 While the Public Protector, Special Investigative Unit and the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation all 
have a mandate to investigate offences relating to corruption and often function in a collaborative manner, their 
degree of authority varies – where the Public Protector sites at the apex. The authority of the Public Protector 
supersedes the SIU and Hawks in that its decision making is constitutional binding.  
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• The National Assembly’s resolution (which was based on Minister Nxesi’s report) was 
inconsistent with the Constitution and considered wholly unlawful; 
• The National Treasury had to determine a reasonable amount for five non-security 
features to be paid by Zuma 45 days after the ruling (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, 2016). 
Before this judgement was handed down, Advocate Jeremy Gauntlett, on behalf of Zuma, 
conceded that the PP’s findings were binding and that Zuma will pay back a portion of the 
money to the state (Gqubule, 2017:192). Gauntlett further expressed the view that the perceived 
undermining of the PP was due to poor legal advice, but that Zuma wished to correct this by 
abiding by the PP’s recommendations and put an end to the matter (Gqubule, 2017:131). After 
a lengthy period of assertive campaigns to conceal poor governance and looting of state funds, 
there was recourse to the law.  
Ultimately, the Nkandla matter not only speaks to the kind of protection provided by 
partisanship, but it also reflects a concerted strategy to disregard the constitutional rules of 
checks and balances. This was clearly demonstrated by the unwillingness of elected officials 
not only to be accountable, but to hold one another to account. This unwillingness to account 
and eagerness to undermine the constitutional rules of the game effectively jeopardises 
democratic stability and places the regime at risk of deconsolidating. Without the exercise of 
power on the part of the public, the opposition parties, the PP and most notably the 
Constitutional Court in driving recourse to law, South Africa’s democracy would have 
deconsolidated. 
Unravelling of the Security Justice Sectors 
In addition to the Nkandla saga and undermining the rule of law, the destabilisation of South 
Africa’s security justice sectors by the myriad of patronage networks could also be observed 
during the Zuma administration. It could be seen that since the inception of the Zuma 
administration the Hawks, National Prosecuting Authority and South Africa Police Service 
(SAPS), to mention a few relevant institutions, have been in flux and unable to maintain their 
top leadership structures for longer than five years. This has primarily been the result of a series 
of bad appointments of compromised individuals through political interference. In the light of 
this, the effective prosecution of crimes in order to ensure a well-functioning society has come 
into question. More broadly, it brings into question the stability of a democratic society where 
the rule of law is ill-fully practiced. 
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With regard to the Hawks, several cases, including the Nkandla investigation, led to the 
disbanding of the leadership structure. Anwar Dramat (who was appointed as the Head of the 
Hawks in 2009 and dealt with the Nkandla investigation), was suspended on the basis of the 
claim that he, along with other members of the Hawks, had assisted in transferring Zimbabwean 
criminals back over the border to be murdered (SAPA, 2015). These charges were part of 
several smear campaigns by members vying to replace Dramat in his position. Chief amongst 
people seeking to replace Dramat was Berning Ntlemeza,14 who went as far as lying in court 
about a key witness and denying claims that exonerated Dramat and his associates. These 
charges against Dramat were later overturned by the North Gauteng High Court and his 
suspension found to be unconstitutional (Basson & du Toit, 2017:91).  
Similar strategies of political wheeling and dealing also resulted in the destabilisation of the 
office of the National Prosecuting Authority. The Mokgoro Commission of Inquiry15 found 
that advocates Nomgcobo Jiba (Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions) and 
Lawrence Mrwebi (Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions and former head of the 
Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit) were unfit to hold the office of the NPA because they 
acted under political influence and personal biases in their decisions regarding the  prosecution 
(and non-prosecution) of criminal cases. This political influence, referred to in the 
commission’s findings, related to, amongst many cases, attempts by Jiba and Mrwebi to 
prevent the prosecution of crime intelligence boss Richard Mdluli on charges of fraud and 
corruption (he was accused of utilising funds from the Secret Service Account for his own 
benefit) and murder and kidnapping (The Presidency, 2019).  
The decision to not prosecute Mdluli was the result of Mdluli’s personal relationship to Zuma  
and to Jiba – after his suspension from the crime intelligence division of the police, Mdluli  told 
Zuma that he would help him preserve his position of ANC leadership at the 2012 elections; 
Mdluli also assisted Jiba during her suspension from the NPA by providing her with copies of 
intercepted calls and reports that further allowed her to interfere in several NPA cases instead 
of recusing herself (Basson & du Toit, 2017:81). As a consequence of this relationship, Jiba 
and Mrwebi withdrew all charges relating to Mdluli before they were brought to court (Grootes, 
2016). After the Commission had completed its investigation - and in accordance with the 
                                                 
14 Berning Ntlemeza was appointed as head of the Hawks in 2015 following the suspension of Anwar Dramat. 
15 The Mokgoro Commission of Inquiry was set up in 2018 to establish whether Advocate Nomgcobo Jiba and 
Advocate Lawrence Mrwebi were fit to hold office within the National Prosecuting Authority, following 
allegations that their offices had been compromised as they had falsely prosecuted several individuals.  
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ruling by the Pretoria High Court in 2013 - it was found that both advocates had acted in 
contravention of the principles of impartiality prescribed by the Constitution. These instances 
of political influence exerted over institutions of the judicial system are indicative of an eroding 
democracy. 
Ultimately, when it comes to the rule of law, the Zuma administration showed itself willing to 
compromise the rules and principles of democracy in favour of the desire to conceal poor 
governance and avoid accountability. These acts by the members of the ruling party and the 
former executive, in cases such as Nkandla, are reflective of a gross disdain for the principles 
of impartiality, transparency and accountable governance set out in the Constitution. They 
further speak to the vulnerability of democracy in the hands of a dominant party without 
sufficient accountability. However, notwithstanding the attempted subversion of the 
Constitution, the rules of the game remain in place and various players, including opposition 
parties, the PP and the Constitutional Court, have shown themselves as guardians of South 
Africa’s democracy dispensation.  
4.2.2 Economic Malaise during the Zuma Years 
When it comes to the prospects of regime survival on the basis of the economy, there is a broad 
consensus that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that [democracy] will [be] 
sustained” (Lipset, 1959:75). By the same token, as set out in Chapter 2, democracies edge 
closer towards deconsolidation when they fail to achieve good economic performance (see 
Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994; Diamond, 1999; Przeworkski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 
2000; Lindvall, 2012). This is because positive economic outcomes are not only essential for 
addressing structural barriers of poverty, (income) inequality and unemployment, but also 
essential for ensuring legitimacy. This is because when citizens believe that the regime delivers 
material benefits, the more inclined they will be to approve of, and support, the regime – this 
is particularly the case in newly established democracies.  
Conversely, when democratic regimes perform poorly economically and there is limited 
improvement in the material life of the citizenry, citizens may be inclined to forgo the regime 
in favour of an improved economic disposition – consequently democracies are seen to 
deconsolidate. Poor economic performance relates to indicators such as low economic growth 
(democracies with a per capita income of between 12,195 USD and 2,032 USD), and high 
levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment (Meintjies, 2011:34). When democracies 
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experience prolonged periods of poor economic performance, the democratic regime is likely 
to deconsolidate. 
The legacy of apartheid in which the predominantly white population were the main 
participants in, and beneficiaries of, the economy continues to sustain structural barriers in 
democratic South Africa. This is particularly the case in terms of sustained socio-economic 
disparities, high unemployment and sluggish economic growth, all of which impede 
democratic consolidation. Despite these being longstanding issues and partly a consequence of 
the country’s political history, poor governance and the increasingly predatory nature of the 
ruling party of the Zuma administration significantly stifled the country’s economic ability to 
overcome these challenges. Contemporary South Africa continues to deal with a fiscal crisis of 
a weakening rand, poor service delivery by its parastatals and overall low productivity – all of 
which could be seen as consequences of the patterns of patronage, looting, deployment and 
subversion of the rule of law. As a measure to address this poor economic performance, the 
Zuma administration increasingly resorted to “further exploitation of mineral and energy 
reserves and combining this with a commitment to foreign-backed nuclear power” as a means 
to ignite economic opportunity whilst simultaneously satisfying its predatory interests 
(Southall, 2015:2). The result is that South Africa continues to fall short of the ability to make 
a marked and sustained material improvement in the lives of its citizenry and further legitimise 
the regime as the only game in town.  
 Economic Performance  
The Zuma administration was inaugurated at a time when the South African economy had been 
expanding, relatively speaking – with a rising rate of employment, capital formation and a real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 5 percent per annum since 2004 (The National Treasury of 
the Republic of South Africa, 2008). However, this expansion came to a halt in 2008 with the 
onset of the global financial crisis, coinciding with a decline in Chinese demand for South 
African minerals and raw material resources (Southall, 2015:8). Since then, few gains have 
been made economically. On the contrary, it may be observed that almost all financial metrics 
in South Africa experienced a dramatic decline during the Zuma years – propelling the 
economy into its first post-apartheid recession.  
South Africa’s growth rate since 2009 barely rose above 1.5% per annum to the end of 2017 
(The National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, 2019). In 2017 alone, South Africa’s 
GPD growth slowed from 1.3% to an estimated 0.7% in 2018 (The National Treasury of the 
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Republic of South Africa, 2019). In addition to this bleak image of poor economic performance, 
the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP widened to 3.8% in the first three quarters 
of 2018 in comparison to the 2.3% deficit over the same period in 2017 (The National Treasury 
of the Republic of South Africa, 2019). Apart from a slow-growing economy, the rand-dollar 
exchange rate suffered dramatically during the Zuma years; at the inception of Zuma’s 
presidency the rand was R7.22 to the dollar and by the end of his presidency the rand was 
R13.31 to the dollar, an 84% depreciation over a ten-year period (Schreuder, 2018). Adding to 
this, 12 cabinet reshuffles under the Zuma administration contributed to a capital flight of R500 
billion in 2017 alone (SAIIA, 2017). These factors – collectively and separately – have resulted 
in S&P Global Ratings and Fitch reducing South Africa’s credit rating to below the investment 
grade (junk status) in the first quarter of 2017 – thereby cementing the unfavourable economic 
climate and further decreasing investor confidence (SAIIA, 2017). This lack of investor 
confidence has been exacerbated by large-scale capital flight, where corporate leaders are 
increasingly investing their money outside the country because of a belief that government is 
unable to manage the economy (Southall, 2015:9). In addition, “business moans about a rising 
regulatory burden imposed” by such policies as the Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) and equity employment; “it despairs of limited electricity supply; it 
rails against government incapacities, inclusive of a marked failure to pay its bills on time (if 
at all)” (Southall, 2015:9). 
Furthermore, the gains of increased social spending were curiously accompanied by rising costs 
in civil service remuneration. Rossouw, Joubert and Breytenbach (2014:145) found that while 
social grants increased from 12.6% to 14.2% of total government revenue between 2008 and 
2012, civil service remuneration increased from 31.7% to 42.2% during the same period. In 
addition, total state employment increased by 13% and the remuneration bill increased by 76% 
during the financial period 2012/13 (Rossouw et al., 2014:145). Rossouw et al. (2014:145) 
contend that should these spending patterns continue, they would likely absorb government 
revenue by 2026 – creating a fiscal cliff – where government income would not be able to 
sustain growing government expenditure. This fiscal cliff was seen to be increasingly closer in 
2018 as company income taxes were 6.6% lower than in 2017, while personal income tax (as 
a percentage of GDP) amounted to 9.81% (What South Africa lost in the ‘9 wasted years’ under 
Zuma, 2019).  This picture illustrates the severe strain on the South African economy. 
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Unemployment  
Compounding the problem of a strained economy is rising rates of unemployment. The 
National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa (2019) found that the rate of unemployment 
averaged 27.1% in 2018. This figure represented a marginal decline from the 27.5% average 
in 2017; however, this decline was for the most part attributable to a 16.8% growth in the 
number of discouraged work seekers, who are excluded from the unemployment definition 
used (The National Treasury of the Republic of South, 2019).  One of the biggest challenges 
to unemployment is youth unemployment. According to StatsSA (2017), the youth 
unemployment figure for the second quarter of 2017 stood at 32.2%. By 2018 of the same 
quarter this figure stood at 38.8% and by the fourth quarter of the same year youth 
unemployment reached 54.7% (StatsSA, 2018b).  This situation constitutes a serious threat to 
the prospects of democratic longevity as it not only speaks to the large numbers of youths 
struggling to find employment, but also in that it presents a serious risk to the promotion of an 
inclusive economy and society.  
The Zuma administration made attempts to address the rising rates of unemployment through 
employment-driven initiatives like the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP),16 creating 
941,593 work opportunities for the financial year 2012/13 (The Presidency, 2018). However, 
the majority of these opportunities were temporary, with only 273,938 employees finding full-
time employment (The Presidency, 2018). While the EPWP assists in alleviating the problem 
for the short term, there is no long-term solution. As Hlatshwayo (2017:1) notes, many of the 
employees of the EPWP have no job security, they earn low wages and have no benefits (such 
as medial aid or pension fund). Furthermore, the skills developed through this programme have 
had no tangible benefit beyond the term of employment (Hlatshwayo, 2017:1). Hence, despite 
the achievement of the government in creating employment opportunities, the issue of 
unemployment persists. 
Poverty and Inequality  
Under the banner of the National Development Plan (NDP) (macroeconomic policy around 
which government programmes pivoted) the Zuma administration achieved notable gains such 
                                                 
16 Although initially introduced in 2003 as part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the Expanded 
Public Works Programme has served as a vital government strategy to create employment opportunities and 
alleviate poverty (Hlatshwayo, 2017:2). Under the Zuma administration the EPWP formed a key part of fulfilling 
the National Development Plan’s vision of improving living conditions and creating a more equitable society by 
2030 (South African Government, 2012:29).  
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as lowering the overall poverty levels since democratisation in 1994. However, poverty itself 
continues to constitute a significant challenge to the contemporary economic landscape. To 
address this, the objective of the NDP is improvement in living standards through increasing 
employment, incomes and productivity with the simultaneous reduction of poverty and 
inequality (StatsSA, 2018a). It was thought this could be achieved through the development of 
human capital with a simultaneous emphasis on private sector-led growth and job creation 
(Kotze & Loubser, 2017:46).  
However, while this approach has its merits and the collaboration between state and large-scale 
capital remains in place, this partnership has experienced a degree of strain. The ruling party 
has often accused private sector participants of investment strike – referring to the 
accumulation of financial capital reserves horded in corporate accounts (Southall, 2015:5). In 
turn, the corporate sector has expressed dissatisfaction with labour regulation in terms of the 
BBBEE Act, limited electricity supply, and the influence of trade unionism on business 
operations (Southall, 2015:5). Moreover, while this approach contributed to making a dent in 
terms of poverty and inequality, real eradication remains a distant prospect. 
StatsSA’s (2018a) report on poverty and inequality in South Africa showed that, according to 
the upper-bound national poverty line, which is based on households whose food expenditure 
is very close to the poverty line of R992,00 per person, nearly half of the population was 
considered chronically poor in 2015. A second segment of the population had an above average 
chance of falling into poverty and a third segment (the non-poor but vulnerable) faced an above 
average risk of slipping into poverty, even though their basic needs are currently being met 
(StatsSA, 2018a). The StatsSA (2018a) report also revealed that South Africa’s poverty rate is 
higher than that of other upper-middle-income countries and higher than that of other countries 
with a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) less than that of South Africa. In focusing on 
the period between 2011 and 2015, StatsSA (2018a) showed that at least three million people 
slipped into poverty during this period, consequently raising the poverty rate from 36% to 40%. 
Moreover, Chitiga-Mabugu, Mupela, Ngwenya, and Zikhali (2016:200) argue that inequality 
reduction has seen even more meagre gains by comparison of poverty reduction. According to 
the consumption expenditure data for 2014/5, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies 
in the world – where inequality has consistently increased since 1994 and by 2015 measured 
0.63 (StatsSA, 2018a). In addition, StatsSA (2018a) found that wealth inequality is high and 
has been growing over time (2008-2015). The data captured indicated that the top percentile of 
households had 70.9% of the wealth and the bottom 60% had 7.0% – indicating that the 
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disparity between richer households is almost 10 times that of smaller households (StatsSA, 
2018a).  
Ailing State Parastatals 
Beyond these structural issues, predatory governance by the Zuma ruling party resulted in stark 
failures of state parastatals which contributed to the economic malaise. Southall (2015:4) 
remarks that “virtually all [parastatals] appear to be confronting a crisis of performance”, all of 
which could be attributed to the various patterns of patronage and poor governance outlined in 
Chapter 3. The country’s economy has borne the brunt in terms of years of load shedding as a 
result of the incapacity of Eskom to meet demand. The commissioning of new power stations 
- such as Medupi, Kusile and Ingula - to increase capacity has been hampered by a reluctance 
of government to concede to Eskom’s demands for higher prices, in turn resulting in lack of 
adequate investment – prospects which have been further impeded by a junk bond status rating 
(Business Day, 2015). In addition, the commissioning of new power stations has faced serious 
delays because of underperformance of contractors and labour disputes, the financial 
consequence of which was doubling the cost of their initial budgets (Denton, 2015; Eberhard 
& Godinho, 2017). As noted in Chapter 3, one of the biggest financial problems within Eskom 
has been its operating expenditure, with specific reference to coal procurement – in which 
average coal costs rose to R400 per ton up from R190 per ton in 2011 (Eberhard & Godinho, 
2017). Burgeoning costs have translated into higher electricity tariffs, up by more than 400% 
over the past decade (Eberhard & Godinho, 2017; Denton, 2015). Furthermore, maintenance 
failures at existing power stations have resulted in rolling blackouts and periodic load shedding 
likely to continue indefinitely.  
However, Eskom is but one of many South African parastatals stymied by debt and 
mismanagement. Issues of performance have also been replicated at South African Airways 
(SAA), which continues to function at huge losses, requiring perpetual bailouts by Treasury 
(Southall, 2015:5). In the period between 2016 and 2017 SAA reported a loss of R4.5 billion, 
a figure that is significantly higher than the R1.7 billion it estimated in September 2016 
(Steenekamp, 2017:74). Furthermore, the lack of due diligence, irregular and illegal awarding 
of tender contracts by members of the Transnet board for the supply of 1 064 locomotives not 
only cost the state approximately R54.4 billion as the locomotives did not fit the specifications 
of South Africa’s existing railway system, but also has left infrastructure severely 
underdeveloped (Ncana, 2018). Consequently, the burgeoning costs generated by each of these 
ailing parastatals places an ever-greater burden on the fiscus (Southall, 2015:5). Kane-Berman 
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(2014) comments that the irony of the parastatals weakened by predatory governance and their 
consequent dependence on Treasury makes it ever more likely that there will be calls for 
privatisation, contradicting the ANC preference of state-owned enterprises driving the 
developmental state. 
Remedy – A Search for Resource Extraction, Exploitation and Patronage 
To avoid heading towards a ‘fiscal cliff’, the Zuma administration sought numerous remedies 
to stimulate a more reciprocal revenue stream in government income and expenditure, prime 
amongst which was the exploration to find new sources of energy resources (Southall, 2015:7). 
The Zuma administration engaged in talks with major international oil giants for the prospect 
of tapping into offshore oil and gas reserves. In October 2014 Zuma announced at the launch 
of Operation Phakisa (Sesotho for ‘hurry up’) that resources found beneath the ocean floor 
could contribute R177 billion to GDP in 20 years (Southall, 2015:7).  
In addition to this approach to resource exploitation, the Zuma administration, with the 
Department of Energy (DoE) and Eskom, also fervently advocated for a shift towards nuclear 
energy. In June 2008 the DoE promogulated a Nuclear Energy Policy (Southall, 2015:7). It had 
insisted on this approach despite several warnings by the National Planning Commission 
(NPC) and former finance Minister Pravin Gordhan that a nuclear strategy would be financially 
unaffordable. While the DoE was persuaded to revisit the Integrated Energy Plan – a plan that 
served as the overarching guide to the country’s energy future – Zuma assumed a personal role 
in attempting to implement the nuclear policy (Basson & du Toit, 2017:70).   
By October 2014 a Russian nuclear company, Rosatom, and the South African government 
announced the start of an intergovernmental agreement which included the procurement and 
development of a large-scale nuclear power plant with Russian VVER reactors with a total 
installed capacity of up to 9.6 GW (Hunter & Faull, 2014).  It was speculated that during the 
BRICS summit in July 2014 Zuma and Vladimir Putin were in private talks to spearhead the 
deal. Given the myriad of scandals that implicated Zuma in predatory business deals, this deal 
“aroused further suspicions about the [former] president’s probity” (Southall, 2015:7). 
However, a more concerning factor was that this deal was expected to be ‘vendor-financed’ by 
a loan of R1 trillion from Russia to South Africa, which would be repaid by revenue generated 
from the sale of nuclear energy. The expectation was that in the long-term nuclear energy would 
alleviate the prevailing issues that plagued Eskom’s stretched resources and further generate 
massive income for the government.  
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However, opponents of this approach immediately pointed out that “cost overruns for the 
building of nuclear power stations are generally between 50 and 200%”, this would potentially 
hugely increase the price of electricity for consumers in the future (Southall, 2015:8). 
Gottschalk (2015:38) put forward a similar argument, stating that the global atomic industry 
generally advises against fixed costs contracts, implying that as inflation rises so the cost to the 
taxpayer will rise simultaneously. In addition, a loan of R1 trillion would raise national debt 
incrementally and put electricity even further out of reach of the poor – ultimately crippling 
South Africa’s already weakened economy.  
Furthermore, Gottschalk (2015:35) points out that while the pursuit of nuclear energy is wholly 
unfeasible for a country like South Africa, other sources of energy exist and are comparatively 
more economically viable. Gottschalk (2015:35), pointing to the Eskom-Shanduka contract, 
argues that the construction and sourcing of gas-generated power stations is more viable in that 
there are vast gas reserves in Mozambique, Kenya and Tanzania that can be easily sourced by 
South Africa. Moreover, Gottschalk (2015:35) notes that these gas-fired stations are fast to 
build and can easily be plugged into South Africa’s national grid. In the light of these 
alternatives to nuclear energy, Gottschalk (2015) contends that the insistence by the Zuma 
administration rested exclusively on political motivations and the prospect of further 
opportunities to loot funds.   
The early economic gains made by democratic governance were largely overshadowed by 
subsequent economic ills. South Africa’s economy continues to be plagued, to this day, by 
inherent disparities in terms of unemployment, poverty, and income equality. These issues were 
compounded by the predatory politics of the Zuma administration, which increasingly sought 
new strategies that would create opportunities for them to capitalise on in their own interests. 
In the light of this, it could hardly be concluded that South Africa has achieved the kind of 
economic capacity that it requires to consolidate. On the contrary, the present economic 
landscape represents a drift closer to democratic deconsolidation – where citizens’ faith in the 
ability of the regime to make a marked improvement in the lives of the citizenry has not yet 
been realised.  
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4.3 Attitudinal Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation  
 
Figure 4. 2: Attitudinal Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation 
As the prevailing framework for the assessment undertaken by this study suggests, a 
democratic regime cannot edge closer to consolidation without the support of the people. In 
other words, an enduring democratic regime does not depend only on good governance, robust 
institutions or economic progress alone, but also needs its citizens to affirm it as the “only game 
in town” – both by an expressed embrace of the mechanisms that the system provides in the 
making of government and through a rejection of all alternative non-democratic forms of 
government (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2012, 
2013). Without the citizenry affirming the regime as the most appropriate system of 
government, democracy becomes vulnerable to deconsolidate. Also, as acknowledged in the 
analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2, in newly established democracies, where citizens 
have no prior experience of democratic government, preference for the regime is often 
influenced by an evaluation of the performance and quality of government both in terms of its 
ability to deliver desired political and economic goods, suggesting an instrumental 
understanding of democracy (Jou, 2016:596). This means that where democratic governments 
are considered to have failed to deliver on the desired performance, citizens will be more open 
to non-democratic alternatives and adopt radical dispositions, which move democracies closer 
to deconsolidation. This theoretical observation is perhaps nowhere more significant than in 
South Africa, where citizens’ support for democracy is observed to be weaning amid growing 
appeals for non-democratic alternatives for better performance. 
4.3.1 Support for Democracy in South Africa: An Instrumental Appreciation 
In terms of support for a democratic regime, there has been a gradual decline in recent years 
compared to the initial very high post-1994 levels of support for democracy. Using the data 
from the study by de Jager and Steenekamp (2019:12), which was based on the last four waves 
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of the World Values Survey and measured support for democratic and non-democratic regime 
types (ranging from dictatorship, technocracy and military rule) between 1995 and 2013, 
Figure 4.3 shows that support for democracy was high in the early transitional years – peaking 
at 90.2% in 2006. However, since 2006 South Africans’ support has steadily declined, reaching 
its lowest level – 72.0% in 2013 – since the transition from authoritarian rule. More concerning 
is that during the same period in which support for democracy declined, support for non-
democratic alternative regime types increasingly increased. Where less than a third of South 
Africans supported non-democratic regimes in 1995 and 2001, this was followed by 
incremental increases “of 12.7% in 2006 and 18.6% increase between 2006 and 2013”. As de 
Jager and Steenekamp (2019:12) note, “for the first time since the transition, the majority of 
South Africans (61.0%) indicated that they support various forms of non-democratic rule”.  
Figure 4. 3: Levels of Support for Democratic and Non-Democratic Rule in South 
Africa, 1995-2013 
 
Source: de Jager, N. & Steenekamp, C. 2019. Political radicalism: Responding to the 
legitimacy gap in South Africa, in U. van Beek (ed.). Democracy Under Threat: A Crisis 
of Legitimacy. Stellenbosch: Palgrave Macmillan. 
A possible explanation for these opposing trends of support could be found in the type of 
support generated by the South African citizenry. Many scholars note that South Africans 
indicate an instrumental appreciation of democracy – where citizens value democracy for the 
goods it can deliver (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Steenekamp, 2017; Mattes, 2019). This is 
because, under the apartheid regime, “the majority of South Africans were excluded from 
participation in the formal economy, disparities were racially divided, and the delivery of 
political and economic goods disproportionately favoured white South Africans” (von Fintel 
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& Ott, 2017:78). It is in this context of the political and associated socio-economic disparities 
that characterised the expectations of most South Africans that the shift to democracy or 
attainment of political freedom would also rectifying the manifold layers of inequality – 
particularly economic inequality (von Fintel & Ott, 2017:78). This perception was further 
cemented through the liberation rhetoric of promises by the ANC to deliver a better standard 
of living and equal access to amenities (Melber, 2018:2-3). Consequently, South Africans tend 
to value and define democracy mainly in terms of what economic goods it can deliver, and the 
ANC is seen to be a facilitator of this process (von Fintel & Ott, 2017:78). In this regard, South 
African’s support for democracy is not only utilitarian but also rooted in performance 
evaluations.  
4.3.2 Perceptions and Evaluations of the Performance of Zuma’s Government 
In the light of this and the prevailing discussion of the contemporary socio-economic landscape 
(characterised by persistent poverty, unemployment and inequality) it could be argued that the 
performance of the ANC under the Zuma administration has been negatively evaluated by 
South African citizens. This could be because the promise of a better standard of living “and 
the ensuing expectation thereof stands in stark contrast to the socio-economic reality in which 
income remains highly polarized and South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies 
in the world” (StatsSA, 2018a:xiv). The data on the performance of the Zuma administration 
taken from Afrobarometer presented in Figure 4.4 indicates the low levels of faith South 
Africans had in the Zuma administration’s ability to handle key performance areas. While the 
Zuma administration was as seen as performing “fairly well” or “very well” in areas such as 
distributing welfare payments (84%) and addressing educational needs (60%), fewer than one-
third (22%) believed that the administration effectively narrowed the gap between the rich and 
the poor, while even fewer (20%) felt the government was tackling corruption effectively. The 
study by Lekalake and Nkomo (2016) found that eight out of 10 South Africans (83%) saw 
corruption as having increased between 2014 and 2015. Additionally, for the duration of 
Zuma’s tenure, his administration was perceived to have performed especially badly in 
reducing crime, managing immigration and the economy, and fighting corruption. 
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Figure 4. 4:  Government Performance under the Zuma Administration, 2009-2018 
Source: Report card: The Zuma era in South Africa, 2009-2018. 2018. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.afrobarometer.org/press/report-card-zuma-era-south-africa-2009-2018  
Accordingly, it can be seen that the initial pro-poor stance adopted by the Zuma administration 
hardly generated material gains (Steenekamp, 2017:71). On the contrary, achievements of 
many of these intended aims was overshadowed by the myriad of scandals reported by the 
media, implicating many political officials within the ANC in the misuse of state funds and the 
improper awarding of state contracts to benefit cronies.  
A further consequence of this perception of poor government performance amid growing 
corruption and nepotism is that public faith in government institutions – even those tasked with 
ensuring checks and balances – has also been severely eroded. The data by Afrobarometer 
presented in Figure 4.5 indicates that since 2006 the levels of trust in state institutions have 
declined across all institutions, except for the office of the PP. The sharpest declines in 
confidence (13%) were related to Parliament and occurred during Zuma’s tenure 2008-2015. 
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Figure 4.5 shows that while the PP enjoys the highest level of trust (58%), the courts (56%) 
and Parliament (41%) are among the least trusted institutions.  
Figure 4. 5:  Levels of Trust in Institutions in South Africa, 2000-2015 
Source: Lekalake, R. & Nkomo, S. 2016. South Africans Demand Government 
Accountability amid Perceptions of Growing Corruption [Online]. Available:  
https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad126-south-africans-demand-government-
accountability-amid-perceptions-of-growing-corruption 
Amid growing distrust of state institutions there is a growing perception that public officials 
guilty of crime often go unpunished. Lekalake and Nkomo (2016) found that more than two 
thirds (68%) of citizens believe that officials who commit crimes pertaining to corruption or 
otherwise ‘always’ or ‘often’ go unpunished (Lekalake and Nkomo, 2016). Similarly, Kotze 
and Loubser (2017:48) found that “public confidence in state institutions largely mirrors its 
perceptions of widespread corruption in South Africa” – where the institutions believed to be 
the most corrupt (Parliament and the civil service) enjoyed the least confidence (43% and 32% 
respectively). These findings are worrisome in that they not only indicate a culture of 
dishonesty and greed by the perceived undemocratic behaviour of officials, but also reflect a 
citizenry whose faith in government institutions to function according to just democratic 
principles has been broken. 
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4.3.3 Support for Non-Democratic Alternatives 
The consequences of this evaluation of the poor performance of the Zuma administration have 
had a marked effect on the way South Africans express support for democracy; an increasing 
proportion of citizens are willing to give up democratic multiparty elections in favour of better 
service delivery. The data by Afrobarometer, presented in figure 4.6, showed that despite South 
Africans indicating a preference for elections, the majority are open to forgoing elections in 
return for good service delivery by the government. In addition, 62% said they are “willing” or 
“very willing” to forgo elections if a non-elected leader or government were able to provide 
housing, jobs, and impose law and order. These positions not only speak to the depth of South 
Africans’ dissatisfaction with the quality of democratic government, but are also indicative of 
an increasing openness to radical non-democratic dispositions.  
This increasing openness to forgo democratic government in favour of a strong government 
that can perform better has provided fertile ground for radical populist parties to exert 
influence. The populist militant party, the EFF, has increasingly found favour amongst the 
youth, the workers and the disenfranchised by persuading the body politic to trade certain 
political liberties for the prospect of greater economic freedom (Steenekamp, 2017:72-73). 
These types of radical populist sentiments have already gained traction within the political 
landscape of South Africa, where the EFF managed to win 6.35% of the national vote in the 
2014 election and secured a 11% share of the national vote in 2019. While this level of support 
is relatively far below the numbers achieved by the ANC, the EFF has succeeded not only in 
promoting a combative and hostile politics, but also in establishing itself as an antagonistic 
force to the ruling ANC.  
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Figure 4. 6: South Africans Willingness to Forgo Elections in Exchange for Security, 
Housing and Jobs in 2018 
 
Source: Felton, J. 2018. Increasingly non-partisan, South Africans willing to trade elections 
for security, housing, jobs [Online]. Available: 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad248-increasingly-non-partisan-south-
africans-willing-trade-elections-security-housing  
Ultimately, there are several disconcerting trends when it comes to the attitudinal condition of 
democratic deconsolidation applied to South Africa. The failure to deliver the expected 
economic (improved standard of living) and political goods (officials internalising and 
upholding democratic principles) could be observed to result in South Africans’ loss of faith in 
democracy (Steenekamp, 2017:72). Hence, a waning support for democracy and a growing 
appeal for non-democratic alternatives largely reflects a mismatch between citizens’ 
expectation that democracy delivers an improved quality of economic life through its political 
liberty, and the stark reality of socio-economic ills that are exacerbated by predatory politics. 
Mattes (2019) observed that South Africans’ support democracy, while at the same time being 
discontented with its achievements in terms of its performance outcomes. The governance of 
the ANC, which reflects a culture of repudiation of the rule of law, a political elite driven by 
the material rewards of public office, a weakening of key institutions through a blurring of 
state-party lines in everyday practices alongside the structural conditions of extreme economic 
inequality and poverty all contribute towards citizens’ growing distaste for democratic 
government and regime types.  
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4.4 Behavioural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation 
 
Figure 4. 7: Behavioural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation largely 
requires a consideration of whether actors abide by the rules of the game (Schedler, 2001:70). 
In other words, the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation requires an assessment 
of whether actors are tolerant of and adhere to the country’s legal framework, namely the 
Constitution. Accordingly, the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation implies 
that when actors subvert the rules of the game and adopt antidemocratic behaviours (inducing 
violence in the system), then democracies are likely to deconsolidate (Schedler, 2001:70; Linz 
& Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1997b; Burnell, 2008).  
It should be acknowledged that while antidemocratic behaviours play a constitutive role in 
causing the regime to deconsolidate, these behaviours themselves do not operate independently 
but serve as a manifestation of attitudes. In other words, behaviours are informed by attitudes 
– with the latter driving the outcomes of the former.  
Nonetheless, the behavioural condition of any democracy refers, broadly, to two components; 
non-acceptance of electoral outcomes and the use of violence. In relation to the former, 
democracies are likely to deconsolidate when actors prohibit the participation of opposition 
parties in the political process or negate electoral outcomes, while according to the latter, 
democracies are likely to deconsolidate when actors use violence instead of the democratic 
process to affect electoral change.  
4.4.1 Non-acceptance of Electoral Outcomes 
When it comes to accepting electoral outcomes, it could be seen that, despite the existence of 
a dominant party which has governed since the dawn of democratisation in the country, South 
Africa has succeeded in establishing a culture which embraces electoral politics. This is 
because South Africa has held six national elections which have largely been deemed free and 
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fair by most accounts, “especially in their adjudication by the Electoral Commission of South 
Africa (IEC)” (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:106). Despite the ANC’s dominance, South Africa’s 
political landscape has included a wide range of opposition groups, with at least 29 parties 
competing in the national elections in 2014 alone (IEC, 2014). This element of electoral politics 
is in large part attributable to the proportional representation electoral system, which has 
encouraged the participation of the opposition in the political process (du Toit & de Jager, 
2014:97).  
Furthermore, while there has not been a turnover in terms of an exchange of parties governing 
at a national level, there have been successful exchanges of power both within the ANC at 
national as well as provincial and local government levels. In relation to the national level, the 
ANC has demonstrated a culture of leadership change; between 1994 and 2016 South Africa 
has had five different presidents – this includes interim presidents (du Toit & de Jager, 
2014:106). Additionally, at provincial level the ANC has shown an acceptance of electoral 
outcomes; in the 2016 watershed provincial elections in which the overall support base of the 
ANC declined, the party lost control of three major metros – Tshwane, Johannesburg and 
Nelson Mandela Bay – to the official opposition and did not contest this outcome (de Jager & 
Parkin, 2017:8). This indicates that South Africa has succeeded in achieving a political playing 
field in which the political parties and participants adhere to the rules of the game.  
However, it should be acknowledged that while the ANC has accepted electoral defeat and has 
not overtly attempted to challenge electoral outcomes, it has always maintained a sceptical, 
often antagonistic, perception of opposition (both in terms of political parties and civil society 
at large). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution (NDR) has 
largely resulted in the conflation of the party and project of transformation, in which the former 
is perceived as being the sole agent of transformation and anything outside of this is considered 
as representing the forces opposed to transformation. This was largely underscored at the 
ANC’s 52nd National Conference in 2007 in which the ANC maintained that mainstream media 
constituted “a major ideological offensive” through being controlled by supposed 
predominantly white institutions that continue to adopt an agenda to “retain old apartheid 
economic and social relations” by casting the moves of the ruling party in a negative light 
(ANC, 2007:44). According to the ANC (2007), the media should instead contribute to the 
transformation of South Africa by supporting the NDR rather than resisting it; in this regard 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was considered as particularly important 
to the NDR. 
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De Jager (2009:281) contends that “by insisting that supposedly predominantly white 
institutions, such as businesses and the media, are merely products of apartheid and are more 
motivated by racism, the ANC is able to undermine institutions that provide a check on its 
power”. Hence, by casting opposition forces as anti-transformative agents of apartheid, the 
ANC is able to discredit criticism of poor governance and simultaneously justify its over-
extension on the state. Again, this speaks to the overall tension that exists between the 
centralised and partisan nature of ANC governance and the presiding rule of law. 
4.4.2 Use of Violence 
When it comes to political participation, worrying trends are observed. Amid growing 
dissatisfaction with the performance of government under the Zuma administration, there was 
an increasing propensity to resort to demonstrations of a violent nature when it came to political 
participation in South Africa. While demonstrations and active political participation are 
widely regarded as constructive and conventional in a democratic state, the use of violence as 
a concomitant component violates the rules of the game. The right to assemble and publicly 
demonstrate is entrenched in section 17 of the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
Hence, the right to demonstrate is lawful. However, the scope around which the Constitution 
permits public demonstration is limited, in that demonstrations must not infringe on the rights 
and property of others (Republic of South Africa, 1996). It is here that the recent upsurge in 
protest action becomes worrisome, as it is observed to be becoming increasingly violent in 
nature. 
Figure 4.8, which is based on data from the Institute of Security Studies and indicates that the 
percentage of events that turned violent (relating to unlawful and unintentional acts such as 
faction fighting, rioting, violent resistance to the police by a mob and forcible coercion of other 
workers by strikers) increased significantly from 44% in 2013 to 63% in 2015 (Lancaster, 
2016).  
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Figure 4. 8: Types of Peaceful and Violent Events in South Africa, 2013 to 2015 
 
Source: Lancaster, L. 2016. At the Heart of Discontent: Measuring Public Violence in South 
Africa. ISS Paper 292. 
The data in Figure 4.8 also indicates that the highest percentages of violent protest that included 
vandalization of private property, unintentional injury to another person or clashes with police 
were related to socio-economic issues, labour (22%), anti-crime/policing (12%) and education 
(9%) (Lancaster, 2016:11). Similarly, Cronje (2014:1) using data from the South African 
police, showed that in 2014 alone South Africa averaged around four or five violent anti-
government protests a day. This is significant, as these protests are not only indicative of a 
response to the performance of government in relation to the respective areas, but also indicate 
that several government agencies other than those at local government level were targets of 
protests – the police, the Department of Human Settlements and the Departments of Basic and 
Higher Education (Lancaster, 2016:8).  
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Education-related protests, such as the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall protests, which 
focused on the quality of and accessibility to higher education, were particularly significant 
under the Zuma administration. Despite the majority (53%) of education-related protests being 
marked by some degree of violence, they largely succeeded in placing the issue on the 
government’s agenda. The government has increasingly taken to prioritising a budget that 
subsidises higher education. In his 2017 budget speech the finance minister at the time, Malusi 
Gigaba, announced that R57 billion would be allocated to fund free education for students who 
came from poor working-class families (with a combined income of R350 000) for the next 
three years (Tshwane, 2018). Cronje (2014:4) warns that while a government responsive to the 
demands of the people is positive for democracy, the danger is that these responses are often 
seen as the rewards in response to demands by means of violent protest. In other words, 
government’s compliance to the demands of violent protests is seen as encouraging that kind 
of combative political participation to ensure government accountability. 
De Jager and Parkin (2017:9) found that beyond the vandalization of property, another feature 
of violent protest in South Africa (and often a product of cadre deployment) is “the targeting 
of local councillors who hold and benefit from political power”. A case in point could be seen 
when large, often disruptive and violent, demonstrations broke out in Tshwane prior to the 
2016 local government elections in response to the ANC’s councillor candidates’ selection 
process and nominations (Segodi, 2016). The decision (by a special National Executive 
Council) to select Thoko Didiza as ANC’s mayoral candidate in Tshwane, whilst rejecting 
three other candidates put forward by local Tshwane leaders, sparked a major uproar amongst 
those who opposed the decision and those who supported the incumbent at the time. According 
to de Jager and Parkin (2017:9), violence directed at these local councillors (who are often 
ANC members) is often the result of cadre deployment, which privileges the selection of 
candidates on the basis of partisanship. 
This upsurge in violent demonstrations has not occurred in isolation from other trends in the 
political behaviour of South African’s citizenry. In fact, the rise in protest is seen to occur 
alongside declining voter turnout. The national and provincial election report by the IEC (2014) 
indicated that voter turnout in the last four national elections had decreased systematically; in 
1999 there was an 89.3% voter turnout, in 2004 there was a 76.73% turnout, in 2009 there was 
a 77.3% turnout, while in 2014 there was a 73.48% turnout. The report also indicated that 
during the same period the number of people registered to vote and those who cast their votes 
also declined (IEC, 2014). These trends in voter turnout and participation is worrying in itself 
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as it is symptomatic of voter fatigue; however, when considering this in relation to the 
increasing tendency to use violent protest as a means to prompt government responsiveness, it 
is even more disconcerting as it points to an eroding democratic culture.  Steenekamp (2017:75) 
warns that the danger in the upsurge in protest action (particularly of a violent nature) is that, 
while the protests signify a vigorous democracy, the propensity for violent protest “runs the 
risk of becoming the dominant political resource used by citizens to mobilize public opinion 
and influence policy makers”.  
Ultimately, South Africa is seen as exhibiting worrying trends when it comes to the behavioural 
condition of democratic deconsolidation. While the country has succeeded in entrenching a 
culture of electoral politics and has consolidated in terms of the basic requirements of 
democracy – peaceful exchanges of power made through popular decisions – it is seen to 
increasingly fall short of an adherence to the democratic rules of the game. The recent upsurge 
in violent protest and the success of this kind of participation in prompting a quicker response 
from government constitutes a significant threat to the sustainability of South Africa’s 
democratic system.   
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
In analysing the South African case using the structural, attitudinal and behavioural conditions 
of democratic deconsolidation, it can hardly be concluded that the regime is in the clear. On 
the contrary, there were several developments under the Zuma administration which propelled 
the regime closer to deconsolidating. Persistent and pervasive poor governance has not only 
led to the looting of state resources, but has, also severely undermined key institutional actors 
that ensure checks and balances - as demonstrated by the administration’s wiliness to disregard 
or evade the rules of the game. Unaccountable governance as exemplified in cases like Nkandla 
has demonstrated the protective power of partisanship and cadrism, and their capacity to 
undermine the Constitution – a red flag warning of a degenerating democracy. However, 
despite this, cases like Nkandla also demonstrate the strength of the constitutional watchdogs 
and opposition parties to secure justice and ensure that the rules of democracy are not 
compromised.  
While this is considered a win, several trends remain disconcerting. The economic cost of 
predatory governance has been weak economic growth, with staggering rates of poverty, 
unemployment and inequality. These problems of the South African economy, while being 
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addressed, have not been completely eradicated. In addition, they stand in stark contrast to the 
accumulating riches of political officials involved in nepotism and state capture.  
This situation becomes even more worrisome when examining the support for democracy, 
which is observed to be inherently instrumental and persistently waning. Considering the 
perceived failures of democratic governance under the Zuma administration, it could be 
concluded that there is a mismatch between citizen expectations at the inception of liberation 
and the progress of more recent years. In addition, this dissatisfaction has placed the regime in 
a vulnerable position, where citizens are not only increasingly vulnerable to populist sentiments 
in terms of policy preferences, but also willing to adopt militant dispositions in their political 
participation. This in turn indicates that the increasing use of non-democratic participation by 
South Africans as a means to effect political change not only violates the rules of the game, but 
increasingly threatens the sustainability of the regime. It would therefore be safe to conclude 
that South Africa’s democracy is at risk of deconsolidating as a sizeable minority becomes 
open to democratic alternatives and adopts non-democratic mechanisms to effect political 
change. 
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Chapter V – Conclusion to the Study 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 of this study made the point that globally democracies are experiencing a decline 
characterised by a growing lack of support amongst citizens for democratic governments as 
well as democratic norms and values. It was also acknowledged that democratic governments 
are increasingly seen as falling short of delivering the expected economic progress and good 
governance. Furthermore, this decline in desire for democratic regimes, their institutions and 
their functioning has increasingly been met with an openness to anti-democratic regime types. 
The contention is that these markers of decline are indicative of democratic deconsolidation – 
denoting a slow death of democracy in which a democratic regime gradually disintegrates by 
moving closer to authoritarianism (Schedler, 1998:94). 
It is this observation of democratic deconsolidation in conjunction with reflection on 
contemporary South Africa – which is increasingly characterised by a lack of civic attraction 
to democracy, an increase in violent protests and the growing appeal of populism amid scandals 
of corruption and poor governance stemming from the Zuma administration – that provided 
the backdrop for the research problem. It was noted that while inquiries into the progress of 
South Africa’s democracy have been abundant, these investigations did not give enough 
attention to the upsurge in poor governance under the Zuma administration and its legacy of an 
increasing trend of disaffection with democracy amongst South Africans. Moreover, while 
there are studies on the progress of democratisation in South Africa, they often lack a holistic 
approach. 
This study, therefore, proposes a holistic approach provided by a framework to encapsulate 
democratic deconsolidation consisting of poor governance, structural, attitudinal and 
behavioural conditions applied analytically to the case of South Africa’s democracy under the 
Zuma administration. Accordingly, the guiding research question was posed: Did South 
Africa’s democracy deconsolidate structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma 
administration? With a secondary question being: was poor governance a key instigating factor 
in this process of deconsolidation? 
In this concluding chapter, each of the study’s constituent parts will be summarised and 
presented as a response to these two research questions. Furthermore, after offering a response 
to the research questions, this chapter will offer a brief discussion on the insights garnered from 
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this study and their implications on the existing field of democratisation studies of South 
Africa. Finally, this chapter will conclude by providing suggestions for future research.  
5.2 Summary of Research Findings 
In addressing the main research question, Chapter 2 provided a definition of democratic 
deconsolidation and an accompanying analytical framework to undertake an analysis of South 
Africa’s democracy during the Zuma administration. The chapter was divided into two 
overarching sections. In the first part of the chapter it was noted that the study of democratic 
deconsolidation has its roots in the bourgeoning field of democratic consolidation. Hence, 
much of the definition and the literature incorporated into the framework are derived from an 
inverse interpretation of the literature of democratic consolidation. By implication of being the 
inverse of democratic consolidation - which is defined as the point at which democracy is 
considered ‘the only game in town’ - democratic deconsolidation is defined as the point at 
which democracy is no longer considered the only game in town. This means that a democracy 
is considered deconsolidated when the regime is unable to solve a set of problems to which a 
minority of actors begin to appeal to authoritarian alternative and these former democratic 
supporters begin to behave undemocratically. 
The second part of Chapter 2 systematically organised the literature on the conditions of 
democratic deconsolidation according to a framework that was used analytically to determine 
the state of South Africa’s democracy under the Zuma administration. This section of the 
chapter was sub-divided into four parts: the first part deals with poor governance as an 
instigator of the deconsolidation process, while the remaining three parts dealt with the 
structural (rule of law and economic development), attitudinal and behavioural conditions of 
democratic deconsolidation.  
In terms of poor governance, it was noted that democracies are likely to deconsolidate when 
governments fail to govern impartially and blur the lines between state and party or person. It 
was shown that when the government exercises the authority of its office in the interests of 
personal or special relationships, then democratic institutions become drained of their 
democratic content, economic outcomes become skewed by corruption, and trust in the 
government’s ability to deliver services effectively slowly erodes. Consequently, poor 
governance is seen to instigate democratic deconsolidation. 
The structural condition of democratic deconsolidation broadly concerns the structures that 
underpin a democratic regime - including the rule of law and economic development. It was 
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shown that in the absence of a stringent rule of law, along with an independent judiciary, the 
rights, dignity and equality of citizens are not only at risk, but the rules of the democratic game 
become vulnerable to the manipulation of powerful political actors. It was also shown that 
while the rule of law is essential in providing the rules of the game, it is not enforced in a 
vacuum but rather requires “an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between 
rulers and citizens” (Schmitter, 2004:47). Without a willingness of state officials and 
institutions to hold one another to account and to be accountable to institutional actors that 
ensures checks and balances, democracy ceases to function. The economic element of the 
structural condition indicated that improved economic welfare is essential to sustain the 
legitimacy of the regime. Democracy is seen to earn its legitimacy by improving the economic 
performance of the country and allowing these benefits to reach previously marginalised 
groups. It was shown that without a well-functioning economy that can improve the material 
welfare of the citizenry, democracy is vulnerable to collapse by having the effect of prompting 
a preference for alternative, even authoritarian, regime types that can better deliver 
economically. 
In the light of the attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation, it was shown that 
democracies are vulnerable in cases where citizens value democracy exclusively instrumentally 
– that is, as a means to an end. In these cases, typically found in newly established democracies, 
there is an increasing willingness among the citizenry to forgo democracy in favour of non-
democratic alternatives, particularly when the quality of governance and the performance of 
government is perceived as being low. It was noted that this openness of citizens to non-
democratic alternatives allows the opportunity for radicalism, populism and extremism not 
only to infiltrate, but increasingly absorb, the fabric of democracy.  
Lastly, the behavioural condition indicated that democracies are most vulnerable to regress 
when political actors pursue their goals through violent means. This relates both to the 
adherence to democratic processes such as electoral outcomes as well as the concomitant 
democratic behaviour that democracy requires. When actors flout or oppose the rules of the 
game or choose non-democratic (violent) means to effect political change, then a democracy 
deconsolidates. 
With this analytical framework established in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 then proceeded to address 
the research questions by firstly providing a contextualisation of the inception of the Zuma 
administration and, secondly, by applying the first component of the analytical framework – 
poor governance – to the South African case under the Zuma administration. In the 
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contextualisation section of the chapter it was noted that the patterns of patronage have deep 
roots in the African National Congress (ANC) through the National Democratic Revolution 
(NDR) (an overarching ideologically-based approach that seeks to transform state and society 
through the appointment of party loyalists to public and private office) and its concomitant 
strategy of cadre deployment. It is this strategy, which allows access to state resources, that has 
provided a fertile breeding ground for factionalism within the ANC. The Mbeki-Zuma 
succession struggle serves as a prime case in point; Zuma’s ascent to power and Mbeki’s 
downfall largely revolved around a response by those ANC factions who were marginalised 
from enjoying the spoils of office under Mbeki. Hence, once Zuma took office, his 
administration focused strongly on rewarding his supporters through cadre appointments and 
deployments, and increasingly on strengthening the hold of the party on the state. It was noted 
that this ultimately served as a catalyst for state capture. 
In building on this understanding, Chapter 3 then offered a response to the secondary research 
question by analysing South Africa’s democracy during the Zuma years against the backdrop 
of poor governance in relation to the prescriptions set out in the Constitution. It showed that 
the Zuma administration increasingly used cadre deployment as a vehicle to retain strong 
personal control of key ministries pertinent to Zuma’s personal interests by appointing loyalists 
to these positions. This was done not only to augment Zuma’s personal wealth, but also to 
promote the project of state capture in which Zuma and his personal allies – the Guptas – 
exerted their influence across key institutions of state to divert rents away from state coffers 
and into private hands.  
It was noted that parastatals – South African Airways (SAA), Transnet and Eskom – most 
clearly demonstrated the nature of poor governance during the Zuma years. In relation to SAA, 
it was seen that Zuma strategically reshuffled his cabinet in 2010, thereby appointing a new 
Minister of Public Enterprises, who could use their position of power to negotiate and influence 
business operations in favour of Ajay Gupta’s scheme to have the airline drop its most lucrative 
route – the Johannesburg-Mumbai route – thereby stripping the state of a key economic 
resource. This was again seen when then Minister of Public Enterprises, Malusi Gigaba, 
appointed Brian Molefe, together with several other individuals, to key positions to ensure that 
the Guptas gained the lion’s share in profits from South Africa’s major infrastructure 
development drive – the supply of new locomotives – undertaken by Transnet. Through a 
network of key individuals and companies, a locomotive tender deal was assigned in such a 
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way that the Guptas and several associates profited by approximately R647 million at the 
expense of state infrastructural development.  
Consequently, the rigging of the tender process and the subversion of the constitutional rule of 
impartiality in awarding state contracts resulted in inefficient service delivery, which further 
eroded public trust in government promises and agendas. However, the most extensive example 
of poor governance was perhaps the periodic radical changes of the Eskom board in which all, 
but two non-executive members were replaced in 2011, and six out of eight appointees in 2014 
were in some or other way connected to the Guptas. The chapter showed that all these 
appointments and replacements were intended to ensure the Guptas could take over Optimum 
(a coal-supplying company) and gain control of Eskom, which led to periodic load-shedding 
since 2008 – which not only cost the country billions each year but has left the parastatal in 
complete disarray to this day.  
Building on the analysis of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 then applied the three subsequent conditions 
of democratic deconsolidation, namely structural (the rule of law and economic development), 
attitudinal and behavioural.   
In relation to the structural condition, it was found that when it comes to the rule of law, the 
Zuma administration showed itself willing to ignore the rules of the game in favour of the will 
to conceal bad governance and avoid accountability. These acts, evinced by the members of 
the ruling party and the former executive president, in cases like Nkandla (where Zuma was 
accused of using state funds amounting to R203 million from the Department of Public Works 
(DPW) to modify and upgrade his private home) are reflective of a gross disregard for the 
principles of impartiality, transparency and accountable governance set out in the Constitution. 
However, it was also acknowledged that despite the attempted subversion of the Constitution, 
the rules of the game remained in place and various players, including opposition parties, the 
Public Protector, and the Constitutional Court, revealed themselves to be guardians of the 
constitutional principles. 
While counter-measures to confront corrupt practices were considered a win in the course of 
democratic consolidation, several trends remained disconcerting when it came to the 
application of the economic lens of the structural condition. It was seen that the economic cost 
of predatory governance was persistently weak economic growth, with staggering rates of 
poverty, unemployment and inequality. These problems to the South African economy, while 
they are being addressed, have not been completely eradicated. On the contrary, the economic 
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malaise of parastatals such as SAA, Transnet and Eskom have weakened the government’s and 
Treasury’s capacity to respond effectively to the overarching socio-economic needs of the state. 
The Zuma administration’s preoccupation with looting parastatals and the expanding riches of 
political officials involved in nepotism and state capture contrast sharply with the under-
development of the state and the dire socio-economic climate. 
Chapter 4 then focused on the attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation by pointing 
to the problem of contrasting the initial expectation of improved economic welfare with the 
rising rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment, precisely in a context where many South 
Africans value democracy instrumentally for the benefits it can provide. Consequently, it was 
noted that the majority of South African’s support for democracy is on the wane, while their 
attraction to non-democratic alternatives has simultaneously been rising. As noted in Chapter 
4, the increasing openness among South Africans to non-democratic alternatives is worrying 
in that it has allowed for populism and radicalism to enter the political spectrum, as 
demonstrative by the rising support of the radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Allowing 
radical authoritarian positions in the democratic political arena places democracy at risk.  
Finally, Chapter 4 concludes with an analysis of South Africa’s democracy using the 
behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation. It was shown that while South Africa has 
largely embraced a culture of electoral politics, it has also increasingly absorbed violence as a 
means of effective political participation. The upsurge in violent protests, which have risen 
from 44% in 2013 to 63% in 2015, threatens democratic progress (Lancaster, 2016). It was also 
noted that despite these events being violent in some ways, they succeeded in placing the issues 
at the top of the government’s agenda. The danger is that while protest action might signify a 
healthy and functioning democracy, the propensity for violent protest runs the risk of becoming 
a normalised mechanism for achieving political change in non-democratic ways. Ultimately, it 
was recognised that while violence is being normalised as an expression of protest behaviour, 
it has not completely consumed political behaviour in South Africa.  
5.3 Responding to the Research Questions 
In offering a response to the primary research question - Did South Africa’s democracy 
deconsolidate structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma administration? - it 
is necessary to reflect on the meaning and denotation of democratic deconsolidation. As noted 
in Chapter 2, democratic deconsolidation is not the extreme antithesis of democratic 
consolidation. Democratic deconsolidation does not refer to a regime which has reverted to 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 97 
 
authoritarian rule. On the contrary, as shown in figure 5.1, democratic deconsolidation in large 
part refers to the process of a democracy in regression edging closer to authoritarian rule. 
Accordingly, democratic deconsolidation is conceptualised as occurring when a regime is 
unable to solve a set of problems, and a minority of actors begin to appeal to authoritarian 
alternative and these former democratic supporters begin to behave undemocratically.  
 
Figure 5. 1: Potential Deconsolidation Path of South Africa’s Democracy 
In the light of this, and in considering the analytical deductions made in the preceding chapters, 
this study affirms that South Africa’s democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally 
and behaviourally. This analysis has noted several conditions that support this stance.  As 
mentioned, structurally, cases such as Nkandla exposed the culture of disdain for constitutional 
governance and revealed the economic cost of this by reflecting on the rising rates of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality. Attitudinally, this analysis noted the impact of poor 
governance on support for democracy, where citizens are increasingly willing to forgo support 
for democracy in favour of non-democratic rule that can yield improved economic and political 
goods. Finally, the behavioural analysis showed a growing tendency towards violent political 
behaviour which intensified during the Zuma years. These conditions are clearly reflective of 
democracy in regression.  
In responding to the second component of the research question – was poor governance an 
instigating factor in the deconsolidation process?– this study contends that the root of this 
regression could be seen as stemming from poor governance under the Zuma administration. 
This is because the overarching national policy approach – the NDR - and its proposed 
governance strategy of cadre deployment – acted as a catalyst for the state capture project. This 
is because this policy has encouraged the appointment of loyalists to key state positions. 
Through partisanship, the Zuma administration has been able to capture key state institutions 
and individuals which has severely undermined and negated the constitutional rules of the 
game. 
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Moreover, poor governance has not only cost the country billions in infrastructural 
development and economic progress, but has instead contributed to the rising rates of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment that continue to plague South Africa. This image of a 
government preoccupied with looting state resources and the dire economic problems that 
continue to proliferate contrasts sharply with the initial expectation of an improved economic 
dispensation that South Africans thought democracy would bring to the majority of the 
population. As such, government performance has severely eroded south Africans’ faith in 
democracy and made these previous supporters of democracy receptive to non-democratic 
(populist) alternatives, such as the EFF. The openness to radicalism has also been accompanied 
by an upsurge in violent protest action as a response to the government’s poor performance. 
Accordingly, the increasing tendency to adopt non-democratic means to effect political change 
is seen as being precipitated by poor governance.  On this basis, this study reaffirms that South 
Africa’s democracy deconsolidated under the Zuma administration. 
5.4 Contributions of the Study 
The contributions of this study are three-fold. Firstly, this study is the first to assess the 
contemporary state of South Africa’s democracy in terms of the consequences of the Zuma 
administration, its strong alliance with the Gupta-family and its highly publicized involvement 
in the state capture project. While these events have been widely reported on, their effects have 
not yet been thoroughly explored in the academic arena. Focusing on the Zuma administration 
allowed a deeper insight into the effects of state capture on the state of South Africa’s 
democracy. 
Secondly, this study is amongst a few to employ a holistic approach by using the analytical 
framework of democratic deconsolidation. While the literature on democratic deconsolidation 
as a perspective on democracy remains relatively under-explored, this approach – when 
combined with the backsliding-focused and pessimistic outlook on the prospects of regime 
consolidation – is able to provide a holistic approach towards investigating democratic regimes 
and the risks they face.   
Thirdly, this study has contributed to the discussion on the role of poor governance as an 
instigating factor in the democratic deconsolidation process in the context of South Africa. This 
has been done by indicating the various ways in which poor governance tends to drain 
democratic institutions of their democratic content, erode civic faith in democracy and 
increasingly make citizens receptive to radical ideas or dispositions. Accordingly, this study 
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largely concurs with similar studies such as the works by Jou (2016) and Foa and Mounk 
(2017), which indicate the various ways in which poor governance instigates the 
deconsolidation process. 
5.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
On the basis of the evidence and findings of the preceding chapters of this study, various 
possibilities for future research can be identified. One of the glaring research gaps could be a 
consideration of the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology as underpinning the NDR and its 
concomitant strategy of cadre deployment on the quality of democracy in South Africa during 
the Zuma years. An investigation of this topic would be being particularly useful in informing 
government policy on state-society transformation and delivering a more democratic state.  
Another research avenue suggested by this study is that of the impact of different leadership 
styles on the quality of democracy. Here a comparative study of the leadership styles of 
Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma could yield deeper insights into the type of leadership most 
conducive to, or most destructive of, a democratic regime. 
A recurring theme in this study is that of dominant party systems and the ability of dominant 
parties to skew the democratic process. A potential research avenue could therefore be to 
investigate whether dominant party systems make it more likely for democracies to 
deconsolidate, or not.  
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